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THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION:
MYOPIC RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE NEXT
CATASTROPHE
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & RENA I. STEINZOR†
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 2008, the contents of an enormous
impoundment containing coal-ash slurry from the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s (TVA) Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant poured into the Emory
River. The proximate cause of the spill was the bursting of a poorly
reinforced dike holding back a pit of sludge that towered 80 feet
1
above the river and 40 feet above an adjacent road. The volume and
force of the spill were so large that 1.1 billion gallons of the inky mess
flowed across the river, inundating 300 acres of land in a layer four to
five feet deep, uprooting trees, destroying three homes, and damaging
2
dozens of others. The catastrophic breach ruptured a gas line, caused
millions of dollars in property damage, and caused incalculable
environmental damage to the Emory River and its receiving water,
3
the Clinch River. A week after the spill, heaps of gray material
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1. R. WILLIAM IDE III & JOSEPH O. BLANCO, MCKENNA, LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP, A
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
REGARDING KINGSTON FACTUAL FINDINGS 4–5 (2009).
2. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,150 (proposed June 21, 2010); Lynn L. Bergeson, EPA Responds to Coal Ash Release,
Pollution Engineering, May 2009, at 19; Editorial, Pool of Trouble, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2009,
at A12.
3. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, supra note 2, at 35,150; Richard
Fausset, Ash Spill Leaves Future Hazy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2009, at C14; Shaila Dewan, Ash
Flood in Tennessee Is Found to Be Larger Than Initial Estimates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at
A10; Shaila Dewan, Coal Ash Flood Revives Debate About Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008,
at A1.
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4

remained in the river like small volcanic islands. Miraculously, no
5
one was killed.
The slurry contained both fly and bottom ash, collectively known
as “coal combustion residuals” (CCRs) in the euphemistic lexicon of
6
environmental regulation. Because coal-fired power plants have
scrubbers that trap fumes before they are emitted into ambient air,
the fly-ash portion of the spill contained significantly more than the
7
quota of toxic heavy metals that typically result from burning coal.
Or, in other words, in an inevitable but ironic twist, the benefits to
breathers were obtained at the expense of walkers and drinkers. TVA
later estimated that the Kingston Spill had released around 2.6
8
million pounds of toxic pollutants into the Emory River. By way of
comparison, all of the other power plants in the United States
released just over 2 million pounds of toxic pollutants during all of
9
2007. Cleanup costs for the federally subsidized TVA, one of the
largest electric utilities in the country, are expected to total $1.2
billion, adding $0.69 per month to the utility bills of nine million
10
customers until 2024.
The Kingston spill was the worst of its kind in U.S. history, but it
was not the first, nor would it be the last. For a brief period of time,
the catastrophe focused the nation’s attention on the health and
environmental risks posed by dumping coal ash in unlined pits in the
4. Fausset, supra note 3, at C14.
5. Id.
6. “Coal combustion residuals” consist of fly ash, bottom ash, boiler slag, and flue gas
desulfurization materials that are destined for disposal. Other names given to these wastes
include “coal combustion wastes” and “fossil fuel combustion wastes.” See Hazardous and Solid
Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,130.
7. Notice of Availability of Preliminary 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 74 Fed.
Reg. 68,599 (Dec. 28, 2009).
8. Charlotte E. Tucker, Kingston Spill Released 2.6 Million Pounds of Pollutants,
Environmental Group Says, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2826 (Dec. 11, 2009).
9. Id.
10. TVA contractors removed more that 5.4 million cubic yards of material and
transported the bulk of it to a landfill in Alabama. Cleanup efforts were expected to last well
into 2014, at which point the residential neighborhood would be converted to a park. Bob
Fowler, Three Years Later, Kingston Ash Spill Cleanup Continues, KNOXNEWS.COM,
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/dec/19/three-years-later-kingston-ash-spill-cleanup (last
updated Dec. 19, 2011). TVA also spent more that $46 million purchasing 171 damaged
properties. Dylan Lovan, Residents, Activists prod EPA for Coal Ash Rules, CNS NEWS (April
18, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/residents-activists-prod-epa-coal-ash-rules-0 (stating
that the utility has “spent $46 million in buying up some 900 acres” near the plant from about
150 owners). In addition to paying $22 million in fines to regulators, TVA agreed to commit $43
million to economic development projects in the county. Shaila Dewan, T.V.A. to Pay $43
Million on Projects in Spill Area, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at A13.
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ground referred to as “surface impoundments.” Prominent national
environmental groups demanded greater protection from Congress
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), both of which had
long skittered away from confronting the problem in the face of
unyielding resistance by electric utilities to any hint of regulatory
intervention that would compel the safer disposal of coal ash and the
reinforcement of old, poorly designed, and carelessly maintained
12
coal-ash dumps.
In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, Congressman
Nick Rahall (D-WV) introduced a bill that would have authorized the
Department of Interior to promulgate uniform federal design,
engineering, and performance standards for new coal-ash
13
impoundments. Three congressional committees devoted six
14
hearings to the need for proper regulation of coal-ash wastes.
Notably, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson promised to reevaluate by
the end of 2009 the agency’s decades-old reluctance to regulate the
15
disposal of some 129 million tons of coal ash generated annually, a
startling figure when compared to the 250 million tons of every
16
category of household garbage that Americans generated in 2010.

11. Subpart A – Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and Practices, 40 C.F.R. §
257.2 (2001).
12. Juliet Eilperin, Disposal of Coal Ash Rises As Environmental Issue, WASH. POST, Jan.
16, 2009, at A4.
13. See id.; Charlotte E. Tucker, Bill Would Require Coal Combustion Waste Regulation
Under Surface Mining Control Act, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009).
14. TVA’s Kingston Ash Slide: Evaluation of Potential Causes and Updates on Cleanup
Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res.s and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009) [hereinafter Ash Spill Causes Hearing]; Coal
Combustion Byproducts: Potential Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on Small
Businesses in the Recycling Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Rural Dev.,
Entrepreneurship and Trade of the H. Small Bus. Comm., 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010); Coal
Combustion Waste Storage and Water Quality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and
the Env’t of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); The
Tennessee Valley Authority’s Kingston Ash Slide: Potential Water Quality Impacts of Coal
Combustion Waste Storage: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the
H. Comm. on Natural Res., 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); Oversight Hearing on the Tennessee
Valley Authority and the Recent Major Coal Ash Spill: Before the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public
Works, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).
15. Shaila Dewan, Administration Plans New Regulations On Coal-Ash Ponds by End of
the Year, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2009, at A20; Eilperin, supra note 12, at A4.
16. U.S. EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE GENERATION, RECYCLING, AND DISPOSAL IN
THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2010 (2011).
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17

Jackson met this deadline. But her efforts were thwarted when
an intensive industry lobbying campaign provoked the White House
to rewrite the EPA proposal, adding two significantly weaker options
18
and derailing the momentum of Jackson’s proposal. The 111th
Congress failed to enact protective legislation and, in the aftermath of
the 2010 mid-term election that transferred control of the House of
Representatives back to the Republican Party, the 112th Congress
nearly enacted legislation that would have divested the EPA of its
19
authority to adopt strong coal-ash rules. Four years after Kingston,
the federal government has yet to take action despite another large
20
spill into Lake Michigan. To the extent that such disposal is
regulated at all, it is subject only to erratic and often ineffective state
21
regulatory controls.
In the past, catastrophic events like the Kingston disaster have
resulted in dramatic governmental reforms, pushing the law forward
to meet new challenges and provide expanded protection for public
health and the environment. Congress enacted most of the regulatory
statutes of the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Public Interest
22
Era after widely publicized tragedies or abuses stirred public opinion
to levels sufficient to overcome the inertia that otherwise overwhelms

17. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,153 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271,
302).
18. James Goodwin, The Delays Get Delayier: The Sad First Year of EPA’s Coal Ash
Proposal, CPR BLOG (May 4, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
BB2B286A-9713-BCF4-C74CD4C1151572A8. For an explanation of the two new options, see
infra note 198 and accompanying text.
19. H.R. 2273, 112th Cong. (2011).
20. Michael Bologna, Sierra Club Plans Lawsuit Against Utility Over Coal Ash Incident
Near Milwaukee, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2578, (2011); Nora Macaluso, Power Plant
Bluff Collapse Dumps Coal Ash into Lake Michigan; Cleanup Under Way, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR.
DEV. (BNA) 2473 (2011).
21. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,133 (stating that 67% of utilities do not have liner requirements for CCR surface
impoundments), 35,152 (“[O]f the 36 states that have CCR surface impoundments, 25 have
permit programs. Permitting is particularly important to provide oversight and to approve
implementation plans such as the placement of groundwater monitoring wells. Without a state
permit program, regulatory flexibility is limited, and certification by an independent registered
professional engineer is necessary.”).
22. Here, the “Public Interest Era” refers to the period of active government extending
roughly from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s.
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Congress and the regulatory agencies. For example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission reacted to the Three Mile Island nearmeltdown in 1979 by putting into place much stricter regulatory
24
requirements for power plants.
The Federal Aviation
Administration has developed a set of new airline safety
25
requirements following nearly every major passenger airplane crash.
The EPA asked for and received authority from Congress to regulate
fugitive releases from chemical plants following the December 1984
explosion at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India that
26
killed 2,000 people.
But in the context of more recent history, the passive response to
the Kingston spill was not an outlier. The past decade has witnessed a
confluence of crises across a broad array of federal regulatory
programs. The response by Congress and the regulatory agencies to
most of these multiple crises has been tepid at best. The Deepwater
Horizon explosion and oil spill of April 2010 generated no new
legislation, and the regulatory response amounted only to a modest
reorganization and renaming of the agency that had utterly failed—
27
and is still failing—to regulate deepwater oil and gas drilling. The
Upper Big Branch (UBB) mine disaster in the same month likewise
28
generated no new legislation and no significant regulatory reforms.
Even when crises did stimulate Congress to act, the changes were by
no means dramatic. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
(CPSIA) of 2008 did little to enhance the Consumer Product Safety

23. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM (forthcoming 2013); Richard J. Lazarus,
Climate Change Law In and Over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 33–34
(2010); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 217–18 (2012).
24. Christian Perenti, After Three Mile Island: The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Safety Culture,
THE NATION (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/159386/after-threemile-island-rise-and-fall-nuclear-safety-culture#.
25. MCGARITY, supra note 23.
26. Bhopal (Chemical Leak), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/international/countriesandterritories/india/bhopal/index.html; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean
Air Act Section 112(r): Accidental Release Prevention/Risk Management Plan Rule (2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/caa112_rmp_factsheet.pdf.
27. Pam R. Russell, Oil Spill Legislation Shows Signs of Clip-Sliding Away, CONG.
QUARTERLY, Apr. 23, 2012, at 798; Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Fallout Begins After
Senate’s Failure to Act on Energy, Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/05/05greenwire-fallout-begins-after-senates-failure-toact-on-54000.html.
28. Kim Geiger et al., Miners’ Survivors Feel Let Down: A Year After a Blast Killed 29, a
Safety Bill has Failed and Efforts to Boost Enforcement are Mired in Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May
8, 2011, at A18.
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Commission’s (CPSC) capacity to reduce the risks posed by imported
products, and Congress soon amended the statute to provide broad
exemptions from its lead-poisoning prevention requirements for
29
existing toys. The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 left much
of the responsibility for protecting the public from contaminated food
in the hands of food producers subject to oversight by a resourcestarved FDA, and it did nothing at all to cure the overlapping
jurisdiction, misplaced priorities, and weak enforcement that have
30
plagued food-safety regulation since the early twentieth century.
This recent history raises the question of why the twentiethcentury dynamic of crisis and reform has apparently disappeared in
the early twenty-first century. Using the Kingston catastrophe as a
case study, this article offers several explanations for this unfortunate
trend. We argue that regulated industries dominate regulatory
debates on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies to an
unprecedented extent. Rather than stressing the importance of
science-based rulemaking, the White House has engaged in its own
intemperate interventions, upping the ante for flexing raw political
muscle at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The growing weakness
31
of the media’s investigative reporting has exacerbated both trends.
In the end, these factors have sparked the deeply disturbing evolution
32
of the administrative process into a kind of “blood sport.” This
degeneration’s most obvious and immediate threat is to our shared
33
“commons,” but over the long run it is equally likely to cause
irrevocable harm to individual businesses and to the efficient
functioning of regulated markets.
Part II examines what we know about the Kingston spill and the
implications of that information for a recurrence of such events. Part
III explains how the EPA and Congress responded to this disaster,
29. MCGARITY, supra note 23; Steinzor, supra note 23, at 218–19.
30. MCGARITY, supra note 23; Steinzor, supra note 23, at 218–19.
31. See, e.g., Jodi Enda, Capital Flight, AM. J. REV. Summer 2010, at 15 (finding watchdog
reporting is at an alarming low at many federal agencies and departments whose actions have a
huge impact on the lives of American citizens).
32. See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport, Policy Erosion in a
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012) (noting “that in this era of deep division
over the proper role of government in society, highstakes rulemaking has become a ‘blood
sport’ in which regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend
millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert
political pressure on agencies”).
33. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (noting
that tragedy can ensue when each actor tries to maximize his or her gain at the expense of the
common good when resources are shared).
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highlighting how politics driven by a deregulatory ideology eventually
swamped the EPA’s deliberative, science-based rulemaking process.
Part IV offers some suggestions for rebuilding regulatory agencies
like the EPA and for restoring public trust in government as first
steps on the way to a regulatory regime that is capable of preventing
future Kingston tragedies.
II. THE KINGSTON SPILL
A. An Engineering Fiasco
For more than half a century, TVA power plant near Kingston
34
dumped its coal ash in a huge, 100-acre impoundment. Like many
other coal-ash surface impoundments, the Kingston facility was built
35
out of the material that it held—compacted coal ash and earth. Since
the dikes that formed the walls of the facility had to stay dry to retain
their strength, the slurry dumped into the pit had to be wet enough to
keep the ash from becoming wind-borne, but not so wet that it would
36
weaken the dikes. This impossibly delicate balance was born of
expediency, not sound engineering.
In the immediate aftermath of the spill, TVA CEO Tom Kilgore
blamed the spill on heavy rain and freezing temperatures just prior to
37
the breach. Anticipating litigation, TVA’s general counsel hired
AECOM, a geotechnical-engineering consulting company with
expertise in forensic analysis, to conduct a study of the “root causes”
38
of the spill. The firm concluded that the spill was caused by a
combination of four conditions—a layer of unstable “slime”
composed of ash and silt eighty feet below the surface of the
impoundment, the high water content of the sluiced ash, the
increasing height of the ash, and the construction of sloping dikes
39
over the wet ash. The study concluded that although the
impoundment was “on the verge of failure,” TVA employees had

34. Bergeson, supra note 2, at 19.
35. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
36. Ed Marcum, TVA Trial Raises Questions of Culture, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM (Nov. 6,
2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/nov/06/tva-trial-raises-questions-of-culture/.
37.
John Broder, Plant That Spilled Coal Ash Had Earlier Leak Problems, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2009, at A11.
38. Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO, TVA).
39. Id.; AECOM, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF TVA KINGSTON DREDGE POND FAILURE
ON DECEMBER 22, 2008, 81 (2009); Bill Poovey, TVA Attorney Says No Proof Negligence
Caused Spill, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/12/
tva-coal-ash-trial-at-closing-arguments/.
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observed “no visible signs of distress . . . that would have indicated
40
that a deep-seated failure was about to occur.”
Critiques soon emerged challenging the credibility of AECOM’s
findings. Earthjustice charged that the consultant had failed to
examine whether the company’s negligence played any role in the
41
collapse. TVA’s Inspector General (TVA IG) later said that one
reason for commissioning the AECOM study was to lessen legal
42
liability. The consultant was told specifically “not to judge TVA
43
employees and contractors” in determining the spill’s cause.
According to the senior manager of TVA’s Coal Combustion
Byproducts group, TVA wanted AECOM to point the finger at
44
circumstances that the company could not control. The TVA IG
concluded: “[l]itigation strategy seems to have prevailed over
transparency and accountability” to the point that the AECOM study
put too much weight on the “slime” theory and insufficiently
45
emphasized the TVA’s institutional failures. An engineering
consultant hired by the TVA IG concluded that “AECOM’s
emphasis on the “slime layer . . . inappropriately diminishe[d] the role
that the design and operation of the Kingston ash pond played in the
46
spill.”
A technical advisory panel assembled by the Governor of
Tennessee to investigate the Kingston catastrophe agreed with
AECOM that “the weak foundation interface layer likely did
contribute to the failure that occurred,” but added that “the stability

40. AECOM, supra note 39, at 81. At the trial of the landowners’ lawsuit against TVA, the
engineer who headed up the AECOM study emphasized the report’s conclusion that the spill
was caused by a “slime layer” of ash that gave way much like yogurt becomes more fluid when it
is stirred. Poovey, supra note 39.
41. Charlotte E. Tucker, TVA Cites Multiple Causes for Spill; Environmental Group
Criticizes Agency, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1561 (July 3, 2009).
42. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
REVIEW OF THE KINGSTON FOSSIL PLANT ASH SPILL ROOT CAUSE STUDY AND
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT ASH MANAGEMENT i (2009) [hereinafter REVIEW OF ASH SPILL
CAUSES].
43. Bill Poovey, TVA Watchdog Inspector Testifies at Spill Trial, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM
(Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/11/trial-on-tva-ash-spilllawsuits-starting-4th/.
44. Bill Poovey, TVA Manager Testifies for Ash Spill Plaintiffs, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/05/plaintiff-expert-in-ashspill-trial-blames-tva/.
45. REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 4; Poovey, supra note 39.
46. REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18 (noting that the TVA senior
manager testified that she viewed the “slime” theory as a “little bit bogus.”); Poovey, supra note
44.
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of the Kingston dredge cells” was at a “critical state of failure
regardless of the presence of the emphasized layer of weak
47
foundation material.” The panel further concluded that a “critical
deficiency” at the facility was “an apparent lack of understanding or
consideration of the evolutionary process of the construction at the
48
TVA Kingston plant.” In addition, TVA lacked an “on-going,
consistent method of design evaluation, documentation and
49
communication to manage the evolutionary process.” “[T]he types
of materials used in the construction of the Kingston dredge cell were
assumed to perform similarly to conventional soil materials,” but the
sluiced fly-ash materials did not in fact “behave in a manner
consistent with conventional clay and silt embankment
50
construction.”
The lack of engineering design for the raising of the cells, the
inadequately understood material properties, pore pressure
dissipation properties and material consolidation mechanisms of
the ash, the methods of placement of the ash, the staged upstream
construction, and the dredging activities all contributed to the
51
condition of the pre-failure structure.

In short, from an engineering perspective, the impoundment was a
disaster waiting to happen, and it was attributable to both technical
and institutional failures.
B. Institutional Culture
Severe management problems also undermined TVA’s ability to
recognize that the Kingston coal-ash pond was unstable. As the
impoundments evolved over the years, the organizational entities
within TVA responsible for the safety of the dikes changed, and the
employees responsible for modifying the impoundments no longer
52
adhered to the original design theories for the facility. Among other
things, the original design called for earthen dikes, not dikes made
53
partially out of coal ash. An expert engineer for adjacent landowners

47. TDEC ADVISORY BOARD, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TVA KINGSTON DREDGE
CELL CONTAINMENT FACILITY FAILURE 14 (2009) [hereinafter TDEC LESSONS LEARNED].
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 14–15.
52. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 13, 16–17.
53. Ed Marcum, Expert Says TVA Coal Ash Dike Not Built as Planned, KNOXNEWS.COM
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/sep/28/expert-says-tva-coal-ash-dike-notbuilt-as/.
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in subsequent litigation concluded that the departure from the
original plans resulted in a dike that was significantly less stable than
54
the original design. He testified that when TVA wanted to raise the
level of the dike in 1975, a consultant’s study revealed that the
foundation of the original dike failed to conform to the original
design and that the dike therefore became weaker as its height
.55
increased.
In a comprehensive report to Congress, the TVA IG found that,
for more than a decade prior to the spill, managers had received
multiple warnings from employees and consultants raising “red flags”
about the safety of the retention pond, but “for reasons that are still
not entirely clear,” they had failed to make “appropriate safety
56
modifications” to address the problems. In April 1985, a TVA
engineer wrote a memorandum to upper-level officials raising his
concerns about the stability of Dike C. The memorandum stated that
the actual construction of Dike C did not conform to the design
drawings for the dike and that preventive measures used in building
Dike C were insufficient. The memorandum therefore recommended
that management assign someone to inspect Dike C on a daily basis
57
to look for signs of instability. The TVA IG’s consulting engineer
agreed that the “safety factor” employed in building the dike was
“less than the minimum acceptable value of 1.5” and that TVA’s
construction of additional capacity, raising elevations above the
original containment dike system, may have further decreased the
58
margin of safety.
Another memorandum, written in 1987, from the TVA’s
Director of Environmental Quality to the TVA Manager of Policy,
Planning, and Budget stated that, “expansions of ash ponds” had
resulted in dikes containing the wet ash becoming “quite high with
59
increasing risk and consequences of a breech.” To address “the
potential for harm to both surface and groundwater from the failure
of a dike,” the memorandum recommended that the “establishment
of more specific inspection standards for these dikes should be
60
examined.” The memorandum triggered a discussion among some

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. (stating that the subsoils became weaker as the depth increased).
Id.
REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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TVA officials about “whether the ash ponds should have been
managed under TVA’s Dam Safety Program, which would have
61
required substantially more rigorous inspections and engineering.”
62
Those involved decided not to change these procedures.
Responding to a small, localized leak at the Kingston retention
pond in 2003, TVA hired a consulting engineer to conduct a slopestability analysis of the pond. The engineer observed “a 7- to 10-foot
thick layer of loose ash immediately overlaying the clay soil beneath
the ash pond” that could undergo “liquefaction” under some
63
conditions, including a seismic event. Although the probability of
such an event was “extremely low,” the consultant noted that the
existing methods for predicting liquefaction were “insufficient” and
64
recommended that TVA improve the drainage in the pond. Instead
of implementing the recommendation, TVA hired a second
contractor, Geosyntec, to undertake a peer review of the disposal
65
plans for the facility and of the prior consultant’s memorandum.
Geosyntec concluded that the “potential for liquefaction should be
estimated and, depending on the results of this estimate, a
66
liquefaction analysis may be required.” If the analysis concluded that
the site was likely to liquefy, then “ground improvement techniques
67
need to be implemented.” Upper-level management failed to
68
respond to this report. A consulting engineer hired by the TVA IG
concluded that the Geosyntec report indicated “the expansion design
should have been modified to conform to a more stringent design
69
configuration.” Another expert, hired by the plaintiffs in the
landowner litigation, testified that the Geosyntec report was
“virtually saying that the site slopes are not safe for supporting people
70
or construction equipment.”

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ed Marcum, Expert Witness Says TVA Failed to Act on 2003 Dike Failure,
KNOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/sep/29/expert-witnesssays-tva-failed-to-act-on-2003/.
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In the end, the TVA IG identified “systemic problems that ha[d]
71
their genesis in the culture” of the organization. Senior managers
“relegated ash to the status of garbage at a landfill rather than
72
treating it as a potential hazard to the public and the environment.”
A TVA-sponsored review by the law firm McKenna, Long &
Aldridge identified “culture failures” that allowed unsafe “conditions
73
to occur and remain undetected or unaddressed.” The McKenna,
Long & Aldridge report described a “siloed” decision-making
structure under which “[n]o fewer than four separate TVA divisions
had responsibilities related to the huge utility’s coal ash facilities.
Although the various responsibilities necessarily overlapped and were
interdependent, communication between the groups was strained and
74
in some instances, non-existent.” The senior manager in charge of
handling coal ash at the facility testified that when leaks were
discovered in the dikes, the engineering department was responsible
for identifying the problem and proposing a solution, her department
was responsible for budgeting resources to carry out the repair, and
the heavy equipment division was responsible for implementing the
75
fix. With so many groups involved in managing the retention ponds,
a “lack of accountability” prevailed—orders were considered
recommendations and engineers responsible for annual inspections
76
made the same recommendations year after year. TVA’s CEO
admitted that “[w]ith little sharing of information internally and no
clear accountability, a culture was created in which the management,
storage and disposal of coal ash and other combustion products were
77
not seen as significant as other aspects of TVA’s operations.” He
agreed that TVA required a change in the “overall culture” of the
organization “to improve the rigor and discipline with which we
78
approach every aspect of our work.”
Other institutional, managerial, and cultural deficiencies
compounded these fundamental communication problems and
pervasive lack of accountability: TVA did not provide adequate
71. REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 30.
72. Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 122 (statement of Richard Moore,
Inspector General, TVA).
73. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Marcum, supra note 36.
76. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 2–3.
77. Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 164 (testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO,
TVA).
78. Id. at 163–65; IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
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training and education to those responsible for building and
79
maintaining the CCR impoundments; it did not provide written
standard operating procedures for constructing, operating, and
80
maintaining the retention ponds; it did not pay sufficient attention to
81
quality assurance and quality control with respect to ash disposal; it
devoted inadequate resources to maintaining the coal-ash
82
impoundments; it reacted to seeps (leaks) and other safety-related
problems with inexpensive “fixes” rather than addressing the
83
underlying causes; and its upper-level management resisted taking
84
safety-related advice from knowledgeable employees. The TVA IG
concluded that “TVA was on notice about safety issues” and that
85
“those safety issues were not addressed by TVA.” Its consulting
engineer went a step further, concluding that TVA “could have
possibly prevented the Kingston Spill” if it had implemented the
86
modifications recommended in the 2004 Geosyntec report.
In the aftermath of the spill, TVA promised fundamental
87
changes, but its public actions give little reason for confidence that
its institutional culture will change anytime soon. Despite the multiple
findings of independent investigators, TVA has relentlessly refused to
recognize the full panoply of internal problems that caused the spill.
Instead, it has steadfastly maintained that the dike failure was caused
by building the pit over a “slime” layer of loose ash and silt eighty
feet below the surface of the impoundment, a mistake that was made
88
decades ago. This emphasis on the slime theory allows TVA to claim
89
that current managers were not negligent, and supports self-serving
claims by the electric utility industry that the Kingston spill “was a

79. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 164
(testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO, TVA).
80. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3
81. See id. at 3–4 (noting that TVA lacked a robust Quality Assurance/Quality Control
plan, which created an environment where employees felt empowered to ignore engineers);
Marcum, supra note 36.
82. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Ed Marcum, TVA Manager: Superior Ordered Deletions to Report, KNOXNEWS.COM
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/05/tva-manager-superior-ordereddeletions-to-report/ (quoting Melissa Hedgecoth).
85. REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 21.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37–39; Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kilgore, CEO,
TVA); Marcum, supra note 36.
88. Poovey, supra note 39.
89. See REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18.

McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete)

106

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

12/17/2012 2:51 PM

[Vol. 23:93

‘one-off’ event caused by a condition not believed to be present
90
anywhere else in the world.” TVA’s active participation in the
campaign to stifle the EPA’s efforts to regulate coal-ash disposal is
additional discouraging evidence that its institutional culture has not
changed sufficiently to provide adequate assurance that similar
91
fiascos will not occur in the future.
Of course, this pattern of resistance by senior management to
repeated warnings of pending disaster is not unique to TVA.
Investigations of other recent disasters reveal similarly troubling,
equally lengthy trails of internal recriminations regarding conditions
that were at least as dangerous and that led, just as inevitably, to
catastrophes. The most notorious example is BP (formerly British
Petroleum), which had a long and disgraceful history of fatal
accidents and environmentally damaging leaks at its American
installations, from corroded and leaking oil pipelines on Alaska’s
North Slope to the massive explosion at a Texas City refinery that
92
killed eleven people. The huge corporation was run by executives in
London who were focused with obsessive tunnel vision on reducing
93
operating and maintenance costs. For example, in the wake of the
Texas City explosion, BP hired former Secretary of State James A.
Baker III to head up an investigative taskforce to uncover the root
94
causes of the tragedy. The Baker commission’s 2007 report did not
equivocate, attributing the accident to a corporate culture that
allowed crucial components of the physical plant to “run to failure”
95
and that penalized workers for expressing safety concerns.
In a similar vein, Massey Energy, the company that owned and
operated the Upper Big Branch mine (UBB) when a methane gas
explosion killed 29 miners, operated at the margins of the law,
amassing literally thousands of violations in the years prior to the
explosion and tying regulators in knots with appeals. Massey has

90. Id.
91. Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264–65.
92. For a description of these events, see Rena Steinzor & Anne Havemann, Too Big to
Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 97–105
(2011).
93. Id.
94. BAKER SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, THE REPORT OF THE B.P. U.S. REFINERIES
INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL (2007), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker_panel_
report.pdf.
95. Id.
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96

received 3,007 MSHA safety citations since 1995 at the UBB. But
the company routinely contested these citations, avoiding correcting
the violations and paying the penalties for months and even years in
many instances. In 2009 alone, the company contested 34.7% of the
97
516 safety violations it received. Massey also contested another
$251,613 in MSHA fines for violating the UBB’s ventilation plan, a
98
critical factor in the explosion. During the years leading up to the
accident, Massey was assessed over $2.2 million in fines at the UBB
99
and had contested about half of that amount. The sheer number of
violations strongly suggests that Massey executives knew of the
dangerous work environment at the mine.
Because these and other fiascos have occurred in succession over
the course of the last decade, inquiries into the adequacy of the
responsible entity’s institutional culture with respect to known
hazards have become de rigueur in the wake of catastrophes. Yet the
conclusion to which these investigations invariably lead—that
complex industrial operations engaged in high-risk operations have
great difficulty avoiding the devastating consequences of failure—
almost never translates into the epiphany that government must step
in both to punish past transgressions and to change the underlying
culture. Instead, that obvious implication is shoved off the table or, in
cases when the catastrophe is so damaging that it cannot easily be
ignored, the individual perpetrator is written off as a “rogue” actor
whose malfeasance is atypical of the industry.
For example, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
effectively labeled Massey as a reckless outlier when it accused the
company of “industrial homicide” a year and a half after the UBB
100
explosion. Coal companies also tried to distance themselves from
101
the explosion by claiming that Massey was an outlier. The industry
argued that while fifty-four workers were killed in Massey mines from
2000 through 2010, the nation’s largest coal company, Peabody

96. Brad Johnson, Deadly Record: Massey’s Mine in Montcoal has been Cited for Over
3,000 Violations, Over $2.2 Million in Fines, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2010/04/06/90370/massey-deadly-mine/?mobile=nc.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. (stating that Massey has contested $1,128,833 in fines at UBB).
100. Ken Ward, Jr., UMW Calls Massey Disaster “Industrial Homicide,” CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201110250214.
101. J. DAVITT MCATEER AND ASSOCIATES, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010,
EXPLOSION: A FAILURE IN BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICE 93 (2011), available at
www.nttc.edu/ubb.
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102

Energy, had only six fatalities during that period.
This
characterization gave solace to the survivors and deniability to the
industry by making Massey the wholly culpable entity, but it ignored
the fact that the rest of the mining industry also games the
enforcement system in similar ways, thereby obscuring disasters-inthe-making. For example, according to the House of Representatives
Committee on Education and Labor, mine operators abuse the
103
appeals process to delay compliance and boost revenues. The
committee found that “blanket and indiscriminate” challenges have
resulted in a backlog of 16,000 cases involving over $195 million in
fines, allowing “irresponsible mine operators to avoid stiffer
104
penalties.”
C. Regulatory Dysfunction
In the absence of any credible industry-wide commitment to take
the lessons of the Kingston spill to heart, our focus must shift to what
government was doing to address the problem. Because the EPA
does not regulate coal-ash surface impoundments, states provide the
only oversight. The EPA’s evaluation of their performance reveals
105
critical failures in key states. And the track record of state
supervision at the Kingston TVA impoundment confirms this
analysis.
The Tennessee Department of Environmental Conservation
(TDEC) had administered a permit program for surface
impoundments at power plants since the 1980s, but the Kingston
impoundment, which began receiving waste in the 1950s, was
effectively grandfathered into the system. TVA did not file its first
permit application for the dump site until the mid-1990s, and the
TDEC did not issue a permit until 2000, after the impoundment walls
106
were already nearly 60 feet high. TDEC then allowed TVA to raise

102. Id.
103. See generally Reducing the Growing Backlog of Contested Mine Safety Cases: Hearing
Before the Comm. On Educ. And Labor, 111th Cong. (Feb. 23, 2010) (testimony of George
Miller, Chairman), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54828/html/CHRG111hhrg54828.htm.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,150 (proposed June 21, 2010) (alluding to “a growing record of proven damage cases to
groundwater and surface water, as well as a large number of potential damage cases” in many
states).
106. IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
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the walls another 20 feet, bringing its total height to 80 feet above the
107
Emory River and 40 feet above an adjacent road.
TDEC conducted quarterly inspections at the Kingston
impoundment. The inspections were limited to visual inspections that
lasted about an hour. The inspector filled out a one-page inspection
report consisting of a checklist and a small space for the inspector’s
108
comments. The vast majority of the reports from 2002 through May
2008 reported “no violations,” and those that did identify problems
109
noted that TVA was adequately addressing them. The problems
that TVA’s consultants identified in 2004 were also identifiable by
TDEC inspectors during their quarterly inspections, but they
consistently gave the ash-retention pond high marks for reasons that
110
remain a mystery.
The history of the retention pond and the multiple post-spill
investigations give no indication that state regulators had any impact
whatsoever on how the facility was constructed, expanded,
maintained, or operated. After the disaster, the governor’s advisory
board recommended that TDEC promulgate more stringent
111
regulations for such facilities. It urged TDEC to “focus on the need
for guidelines or regulations that will improve life-cycle design
requirements and related operational procedures for coal combustion
waste [facilities]” and “require effective management oversight and
112
thorough engineering design philosophy.” It recommended that the
Tennessee legislature amend the Tennessee Safe Dams Act of 1973 to
eliminate exemptions for wastewater-impoundment barriers. It also
recommended that the legislature ensure that all dams with high or
significant hazard were adequately regulated with respect to safety
113
and stability. Although the advisory board did not specifically find
that the TDEC program was inadequate, the extensive
recommendations for improvement strongly suggest that it was not
impressed with the existing arrangements. Ultimately, the Tennessee
legislature enacted legislation prohibiting the state environmental
107.
108.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 12; see DIV. OF SOLID WASTE MGMT., TENN. DEP’T OF ENV’T AND
CONSERVATION, SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY EVALUATIONS (2008), available at
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/123108tdec-inspection02-08.pdf.
109. See DIV. OF SOLID WASTE MGMT., supra note 108.
110. Marcum, supra note 70.
111. TDEC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 47.
112. Id. at 6. In particular, it recommended that TDEC ban the “upstream staged
construction” design that TVA used at the Kingston facility. Id. at 1–2.
113. Id. at 17.
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agency from issuing solid waste disposal permits for new or lateral
expansions of existing coal-ash-disposal facilities if they did not
114
provide for liners, proper closure, and caps. Unfortunately, this
approach did nothing to resolve the national problem of decrepit
coal-ash surface impoundments; it may even have had the effect of
driving the disposal of Tennessee utilities’ wastes to other states.
D. Kingston as Precedent
In the wake of the Kingston spill, with EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson’s reconsideration of the EPA’s non-regulatory approach
making the prospect of strong federal intervention seem possible for
the first time, the electric-utility industry was at pains to distinguish
the Kingston spill from any situation that might conceivably be
addressed by new rules. “The solution isn’t simply to impose the most
burdensome regulation on utilities whose customers would bear the
brunt of the cost. In fact, regulating coal ash as hazardous would not
have prevented the December 2008 spill at the nearby Kingston
facility,” Dan Riedinger of Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the
industry’s primary trade group, told EPA officials at a public hearing
115
in Knoxville. “No one can downplay the tragedy of the Kingston
impoundment failure,” agreed fellow witness Tom Schmaltz,
environmental director of Headwaters Inc., which manufactures
heavy construction materials, “but the Kingston impoundment failure
and other cases cited are engineering failures. We must distinguish
116
between engineering failures and the nature of a waste.”
Taken together, the two statements mask subtle contradictions.
If, as Schmaltz suggested, the only requirement at stake was an EPA
decision to attach a negative terminology to coal ash, he was right
that TVA could have kept dumping slurry at Kingston with impunity
and would certainly have ended up at the same place—with a
disastrous and expensive spill on its hands that had not been
prevented by the federal rules. On the other hand, why, as Riedinger
suggested, would such “regulations” prove so “burdensome,”
motivating such vociferous opposition, if all that was at stake was a
label?

114. Andrew M. Ballard, Legislature Approves Restrictions on Coal Mining, Coal Ash
Disposal, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1146 (May 15, 2009).
115. EPA Hears Passionate Pleas on Both Sides of Coal Ash Regulation Issue, WBIR.COM
(Oct. 27, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.wbir.com/rss/article/139934/2/EPA-hears-passionate-pleason-both-sides-of-coal-ash-regulation-issue.
116. Id.
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In fact, the EPA’s original proposal, ultimately published as the
strongest of three “options” in the rulemaking notice that emerged
from a lengthy White House review process, would have required
that all coal-ash disposal sites meet stringent construction and siting
117
requirements that might well have prevented the Kingston spill had
they been in effect when the dump was first opened several decades
ago. As important, the stringent approach of treating coal ash as a
hazardous waste under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) would have given the EPA authority to
require “corrective action” at old, unstable surface impoundments so
118
long as those locations continued to receive new waste. And siting
brand new facilities within a reasonable distance of coal-fired power
plants is far easier said than done. In short, Reidinger was right the
first time: new, more stringent rules would prove costly precisely
because they would have required extensive retrofitting of old,
unstable dumps that are vulnerable to the same engineering failures
that caused the Kingston spill.
Consider the following daunting statistics about existing surface
impoundments. In the wake of the Kingston spill, the EPA undertook
an investigation of existing surface impoundments’ integrity, finding
that 109 of 584 such facilities nationwide had either a “high” or a
119
“significant” hazard potential rating. In addition, 186 of the units
120
were not designed by a professional engineer. Although the
impoundments were designed to last for about 40 years, 56 were older
121
than 50 years old and 360 were between 26 and 40 years old.
Moreover, 35 units at 25 facilities had already reported releases,
ranging from minor spills to the massive release at the Kingston
122
facility. Indeed, further scrutiny at the Kingston facility revealed
123
significant safety deficiencies at a second site on its property.

117. See infra note 136.
118. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,133:
EPA is proposing to list as a special waste, to be regulated under the RCRA
subtitle C regulations, CCRs from electric utilities and independent power
producers when destined for disposal in a landfill or surface impoundment. These
CCRs would be regulated from the point of their generation to the point of their
final disposition, including during and after closure of any disposal unit. This
would include . . . corrective action, including facility-wide corrective action,
closure of units, and post-closure care . . . .
119. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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TVA is a corporation owned by the U.S. government, supplying
nine million customers, employing 12,000 people, ranking first among
American utilities in energy sales and fifth in generating capacity, and
serving Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
124
Tennessee, and Virginia. As a publicly-owned utility, TVA is
immune from the pressures of share price and private investment. As
a very large electric utility, TVA delivers a crucial product, the
manufacture of which is subject to the same risks of catastrophic
equipment and facility failure that confront its for-profit competitors.
In other words, the dangerously myopic institutional culture revealed
by the Kingston spill could easily plague other utilities, turning TVA
from a “one off” rogue to an urgent example of bad things to come.
III. THE RESPONSE: ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK
A. The EPA Steps Forward
To the great consternation of the electric-utility industry, the
November 2008 election results seemed to change the political
dynamic for regulating the environmental harm caused by power
plants. As a young and apparently progressive president prepared to
enter the Oval Office and the Democratic Party assumed control of
both houses of Congress, the Kingston catastrophe raised the profile
of coal-ash disposal, with national media filling the dead week
between Christmas and New Year’s Day with images of inundated
homes and a river covered with grey ooze. The stage was set for an
unprecedented federal response to the root cause of the disaster.
The Environmental Integrity Project, a prominent national
environmental group, demanded that the EPA promulgate national
125
regulations governing coal-ash disposal. Earthjustice, the premier
litigating arm of the environmental movement, published a report
entitled Waste Deep: Filling Mines with Coal Ash is Profit for
Industry, but Poison for People, detailing the risks posed by dumping
126
coal ash directly in abandoned mines. More than 100 environmental

124. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, http://www.tva.com/abouttva/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2012).
125. Charlotte E. Tucker, Earthjustice Calls on EPA to Regulate Mine Storage, Disposal of
Coal-Ash Waste, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009).
126. EARTHJUSTICE, WASTE DEEP: FILLING MINES WITH COAL ASH IS PROFIT FOR
INDUSTRY, BUT POISON FOR PEOPLE (2009), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/
files/library/reports/earthjustice_waste_deep.pdf. In 2008, EPA estimated that approximately
eight percent of the 136 million tons of coal ash generated that year was dumped into
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organizations signed a letter to newly appointed EPA Administrator
Lisa Jackson urging her to “chart a new, responsible course” for
127
regulating CCRs.
Jackson was receptive. Calling the Kingston spill “one of the
128
largest and most serious environmental releases in our history,” she
announced on March 9, 2009 that her agency was in the process of
129
developing regulations for coal-ash disposal. These regulations
would address the serious problem of unstable surface
130
impoundments. To build a record in support of a protective
proposal, the EPA sent information requests to 150 power plants
owned by more than fifty utilities seeking data on the structural
131
integrity of those units. Agency officials said they hoped to publish
132
a proposed rule by the end of the year.
The Kingston catastrophe also generated a great deal of activity
in Congress, which held no fewer than six hearings on the causes of
the spill, the nature and scope of the coal ash disposal problem, and
133
methods of preventing a recurrence. Several members urged the
EPA to regulate disposal under RCRA, the premier federal waste
abandoned mine shafts. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,151.
127. Charlotte E. Tucker, Advocacy Groups Ask EPA to Take Lead on Regulating CoalCombustion Waste, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 494 (Mar. 6, 2009).
128. Janice Valverde, Tennessee Valley Authority, EPA Agree on $950 Million Cleanup of
Coal Ash Spill, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1116 (May 15, 2009).
129. Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA to Propose Coal-Ash Rule by Year's End, Asks Utilities For
Data on Ash Impoundments, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (Mar. 13, 2009).
130. Coal Combustion Byproducts: Potential Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on
Small Businesses in the Recycling Industry, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Rural Dev.,
Entrepreneurship and Trade of the House Small Business Committee, 111th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2010) (testimony of Lisa Felt, EPA); Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA Says Balance Needed Between
Handling of Coal Combustion Waste, Beneficial Reuse, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1064
(May 8, 2009).
131. Tucker, supra note 125.
132. Id.
133. Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14; Coal Combustion Byproducts: Potential
Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on Small Businesses in the Recycling Industry,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Rural Dev., Entrepreneurship and Trade of the House
Small Business Committee, supra note 14; Coal Combustion Waste Storage and Water Quality,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, supra note 14; The Tennessee Valley
Authority’s Kingston Ash Slide: Potential Water Quality Impacts of Coal Combustion Waste
Storage, Hearings Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, supra note
14; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the House Committee
on Natural Resources, supra note 14; Oversight Hearing on the Tennessee Valley Authority and
the Recent Major Coal Ash Spill, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, supra note 14.
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134

disposal statute. Congressman Nick Rahall (D-WV), the chairman
of the House Natural Resources Committee, introduced a bill that
would have required the Department of the Interior to promulgate
regulations containing federally enforceable requirements for the
135
storage and disposal of CCRs.
In October 2009, the EPA sent the draft of a proposed rule to
Cass Sunstein, the White House “regulatory czar,” known more
formally as the administrator of the Office of Management and
Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
136
(OIRA). That document, referred to here as the “Original EPA
Proposal,” stated the agency’s intention to regulate coal ash as a
137
hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA. The draft preamble to
the proposal cited two distinct categories of harm that justified
imposing stringent federal controls on disposal: (1) the migration of
toxic constituents of the ash into the environment, especially
groundwater; and (2) the probable recurrence of spills like the one in
138
Kingston. In keeping with the theme of responses to disasters, we
134. See Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA Pledge to Regulate Coal Ash Leads Rahal to Abandon
Interior Legislation, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (Mar. 13, 2009) (Rep. Nick Rahall
urges EPA to promulgate CCR regulations under RCRA); Charlotte E. Tucker, Coal Ash
Regulation May Need to Change, TVA President Testifies at Senate Hearing, 40 ENV'T REP.
CUR. DEV. (BNA) 108 (Jan. 16, 2009) (Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) wants “to know what
the EPA is doing to protect the public from the hazards of these toxic coal ash ponds”); Steven
D. Cook & Linda Roeder, Jackson Pledges Review of EPA Policies But Avoids Specifics on
Possible Changes, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 122 (Jan. 16, 2009) (Sen. Barbara Boxer
(D. Cal.) urges EPA to regulate CCR wastes under RCRA).
135. Charlotte E. Tucker, Bill Would Require Coal Combustion Waste Regulation Under
Surface Mining Control Act, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009).
136. The EPA has posted two versions of its draft proposal for regulation concerning the
disposal of coal combustion residuals from electric utilities, hazardous substance designation,
and reportable quantities of residuals. For the original draft, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE; DISPOSAL OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUALS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND
CERCLA HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DESIGNATION AND REPORTABLE QUANTITIES (Oct. 16,
2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-20090640-0013 [hereinafter ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL]. The second version includes red-lining
incorporated during reviews by and negotiations with OIRA. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE; DISPOSAL OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUALS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND
CERCLA HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DESIGNATION AND REPORTABLE QUANTITIES (May 3,
2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-20090640-0012. The two versions of the draft proposal are available in an online docket of federal
regulation material. Docket on Coal Ash, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov
/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Docket
on Coal Ash].
137. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
138. See ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL, supra note 136, at 62.
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focus here only on the second threat. Indeed, we must confess that we
have never fully understood the de-emphasis of potentially massive
139
structural failures by the national environmental community.
Although the pollution of groundwater by coal-ash facilities poses
potentially serious, long-term risks, it represents a more attenuated
threat to public health than massive spills. Moreover, the
groundwater threat is difficult to quantify without extensive
investigation that requires the installation of expensive monitoring
equipment and complicated modeling of the movement of plumes of
contamination within aquifers. In contrast, images of Kingston in the
aftermath of the spill, a mere two clicks away on YouTube, are easy
140
to understand and quite disturbing.
The EPA’s original proposal would have profoundly changed
existing disposal practices. The owners and operators of coal-fired
power plants could no longer have kept sludge in open, unlined pits in
the ground, but would instead have been required to send the ash to
landfills and surface impoundments that met far more protective
design requirements, including the installation of liners, impermeable
141
(rain-proof) covers, and leachate-detection systems. The EPA
would have been responsible for determining those design standards,
although state regulators would have remained responsible for
142
enforcing individual facility permits in most places. Federal and
state regulators would have had the authority to compel “corrective
action” at existing coal ash impoundments where outmoded designs,
imprudent engineering, geography, or other factors created a hazard
143
to public health or the environment.
Yet these changes (and their admittedly steep costs) were not the
frame of reference selected by electric utilities and their allies for a
well-funded, politically shrewd, and, in the end, extraordinarily
effective campaign against the EPA initiative. Had the utilities

139. Earthjustice and the Environmental Integrity Project, the two most active groups, have
consistently emphasized groundwater contamination. See, e.g., JEFF STANT, EARTHJUSTICE,
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT & SIERRA CLUB, IN HARM’S WAY: LACK OF FEDERAL COAL
ASH REGULATIONS ENDANGERS AMERICANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT (2010), available at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/report-in-harms-way.pdf.
140. See, e.g., Mountain Justice, TVA Coal Ash Disaster, YOUTUBE.COM (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGmVCABMRRQ; VidXPress, TVA Coal Ash Spill in
Kingston, TN,
YOUTUBE.COM (July
22,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=dO9k7gMObe8.
141. See ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL, supra note 136, at 311–12.
142. Id. at 236–37.
143. Id. at 61–62.
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complained about disposal costs, not only would they have isolated
themselves, they would have focused attention on the state of illrepair of existing facilities, inevitably drawing a stark contrast
between huge open pits like the one TVA operated in Kingston and
the new, better-engineered facilities required by the EPA’s proposal.
Instead, the utilities recruited an unusually broad cross-section of
industry groups to argue that the EPA’s proposal would discourage
the beneficial reuse of coal ash with devastating economic
144
consequences. The coalition of opponents included companies using
the ash to make concrete and wallboard, as well as large construction
145
companies using it to line roadbeds. They offered to accept further
regulatory controls on coal-ash disposal, but only if the content and
implementation of those requirements were left to the discretion of
individual states—a state of affairs that was in essence the status
146
quo.
The EPA estimated that about 37 percent of the 136 million tons
of coal ash generated—or about 50.1 million tons—was beneficially
147
reused in 2008. Because the agency’s rulemaking proposal explicitly
exempted any and all coal ash subject to “beneficial reuse”—a wideopen category of purposes that the EPA has not yet defined—
148
opponents were compelled to make a more elaborate argument.
They contended that because coal ash would be labeled a hazardous
waste when discarded, recycled coal ash would pick up a “stigma” in
149
the marketplace. People would be afraid to buy it for any purpose
because someday they might be sued for using it. No one ever
explained how consumers would discover that coal ash lay in a road
bed or within a piece of wallboard, much less how individuals would
be able to successfully sue manufacturers or construction companies
for tangible harm so long as the toxic elements of the ash remained
encapsulated. And, of course, if toxic elements could escape from
144. Charlotte E. Tucker, As EPA Plans on Coal Ash, Industry Cautions Against Sweeping
Change, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (2009).
145. Janice Valverde, Coal Ash Comments Number Over 200,000; Industry,
Environmentalists Sharply Disagree, 41 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2931 (2010).
146. Utility Industry to EPA: Please Regulate Coal Ash, POLLUTION ENGINEERING, June
1, 2009, at 9 (stating that groups “would welcome additional oversight” if coal was regulated as a
non-hazardous waste. Non-hazardous wastes are regulated under the Solid Waste Disposal Act,
which establishes minimum federal guidelines for state-implemented and designed plans. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 6941–6947 (1984).).
147.
Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,151.
148.
Id. at 35,160.
149.
Avery Fellow, EPA Must Consider Beneficial Use Data In Coal Ash Final Rule,
Industry Groups Say, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2694 (2011).
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such products, the coal ash would have been re-used, but not
beneficially.
B. The White House Steps Back
1. Centralized Review in Practice
When the EPA did not retreat in the face of the industry
coalition’s spirited opposition, business groups took their objections
to OIRA, the obscure but extraordinarily powerful White House unit
that Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow once called “an office
150
that most people have never heard of.” OIRA is responsible for a
potent system of centralized White House review of regulatory
proposals from all the agencies and departments in the Executive
Branch.
White House regulatory oversight began at the same time that
Congress passed a wide variety of progressive laws protecting
consumers, workers, and breathers from fraud, safety hazards on the
job, and pollution. With the notable exception of the Food and Drug
151
Administration (FDA), the most important health, safety, and
environmental agencies were created during an extraordinary period
of law reform in the early 1970’s that was driven by young people’s
protests against the Vietnam War and their parents’ concern that, in
the absence of a revitalized government, baby boomers would remain
152
perpetually alienated from their country. The industries brought
under the ambit of these ambitious new regulatory regimes
successfully demanded that White House allies of a more
conservative bent ride herd over the reformers in the regulatory
agencies. From the beginning, as Professor Robert Percival has noted,
150. Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 994 (2001) (referring to Harvard Law
School Dean Martha Minow’s introduction of Sunstein on March 1, 2010). For a more complete
exploration of the extraordinary influence of centralized White House review in shaping health,
safety, and environmental regulation over four decades, see Steinzor, supra note 23.
151. The FDA was created in 1906 in response to fraud surrounding the marketing of
ineffective and even dangerous remedies. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938); James
Harvey Young, The Medical Messiahs: A Social History of Health Quackery in Twentieth
Century America, 160 SCI. 643, 644 (1968).
152. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. at
643 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing EPA); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub.
L. No. 92–573, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)
(2006)) (establishing CPSC); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–596,
84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006)) (establishing OSHA); Highway
Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–605, § 202, 84 Stat. 1714, 1739 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 105 (2006)) (establishing NHTSA).
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the distinctive strategy for the regulated industries was the “inside
game,” negotiating behind closed doors for the changes they desired,
while environmentalists, consumer groups, and organized labor went
“outside” to reformers in Congress, publicizing the human costs of
153
the corporate malfeasance they wanted to address.
As the ink was drying on the landmark reforms of the early
1970’s, the Nixon Administration’s Secretary of Commerce, Maurice
Stans, persuaded chief domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman to
154
establish a taskforce to oversee the EPA’s regulatory activities. This
type of oversight continued throughout the 1970’s, embraced by
Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who appointed his budget
155
director Bert Lance to spearhead those efforts. At the close of the
Carter Administration, Congress passed two statutes that codified the
White House’s regulatory role: the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
156
Paperwork Reduction Act; the second statute established OIRA.
The new office was assigned to review any proposal by a government
agency or department to compel individual citizens, private sector
157
entities, and state and local governments to fill out new paperwork.
As President Ronald Reagan entered office intent on rolling back
regulation, OIRA was available to implement new protocols.
158
Executive Order (EO) 12,291, issued shortly after the Reagan
Administration took office, contained the following trio of nononsense instructions:
159
1. All covered agencies must refrain from taking action unless
160
potential benefits outweigh potential costs. The agencies

153. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 134–38 (1991).
154. See id. at 132–33.
155. See id. at 142.
156. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96–354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006)); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–511,
94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)).
157. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–511, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814–15 (1980)
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)).
158. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982).
159. The order—and all subsequent regulatory review orders—exempt independent
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, but covers all Cabinet departments and free-standing executive branch agencies
such as EPA. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, OIRA Adm’r., to the Heads of Indep.
Regulatory Agencies (July 22, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/memorandum/2011/m11-28.pdf.
160. Exec. Order 12,291, §2(b), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
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must also consider regulatory alternatives that involve the
161
lowest net cost.
2. Agencies must prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” (RIA)
containing their cost-benefit analysis for each “major” rule,
defined to include any proposal that would have an annual
162
effect on the economy of $100 million or more.
3. Agencies must send a copy of each proposed and final rule to
163
OIRA before it is published in the Federal Register.
Agencies must respond to any concerns raised by OIRA
164
staff.
The Reagan Administration spent a great deal of time and
political capital fighting with congressional reformers, especially the
generation of bright, young, liberal congressmen elected in the
immediate aftermath of Watergate. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and
subcommittee chairman on the powerful House Energy and
Commerce Committee, James Florio (D-NJ), took the lead in
resisting deregulation, especially in the context of environmental
165
protection. OIRA was at the forefront of these controversies.
George H.W. Bush continued in the direction set by Reagan, albeit
166
with considerably less sturm und drang. The Democrats’ return to
the presidency with the election of Bill Clinton assuaged
congressional Democrats’ opposition to OIRA, in part because the
new administration replaced the Reagan executive orders with an
167
apparently more moderate set of procedures.
The new Clinton EO 12,866, which persists to this day,
authorizes OIRA to review “significant” rules (such as requirements
that would impose economic effects over $100 million annually or
168
“adversely affect” the economy “in a material way”). But it imposes

161. Id. § 3(d)(4).
162. Id. §§ 1(b)(1), 3(d)(4).
163. Id. § 3(c).
164. Id. § 3(f)(2).
165. For a vivid description of these events, see David Osborne, State of Siege: Can
Democrats Mastermind the Great Escape?, MOTHER JONES, Feb.–Mar. 1982, at 22, 22–31.
Professor Steinzor worked for Representative Florio at that time as staff counsel to the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee that he chaired, and they worked closely with Representative Waxman’s
Subcommittee on Health.
166. Steinzor, supra note 23, at 245.
167. Id. at 245–47.
168. Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
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169

a series of mandatory deadlines for the conclusion of review and
instructs OIRA to “make available to the public” all documents that
170
it sent back and forth to the rulemaking agency or department.
These “before-and-after” documents allow stakeholders to track
changes that are made during the review process. President Clinton
171
continued the use of cost-benefit analysis. As a practical matter,
OIRA kept a far lower profile during the Clinton Administration; it
stayed out of the media and sharply decreased its workload,
reviewing between 500 and 700 rules annually in contrast to 2,000 and
172
3,000 under Reagan and Bush. But President Clinton’s enthusiasm
for a strong OIRA presence made it a bipartisan institution,
entrenching centralized White House regulatory review.
Under President George W. Bush, OIRA returned to the
aggressive Reagan model. The new President shrewdly retained
Executive Order 12,866, creating the appearance that he was merely
continuing a long-standing tradition. But OIRA returned with
173
enthusiasm to its higher profile “gatekeeper” role. Under the
leadership of John Graham (2001–2006) and Susan Dudley (2006–
2009), OIRA significantly increased the number of “return letters” it
sent to the agencies, demanding that they reconsider regulatory
174
proposals. Economic analysis became the critical factor in deciding
the content of rules, especially in the environmental arena where
most were statutorily mandated, with deadlines for their
175
production.
Graham rewrote OIRA’s guidance regarding the
methodologies agencies must use to conduct cost-benefit analysis to
176
make them far more elaborate.
The other Bush II Administration change was OIRA’s energetic
assertion of jurisdiction over science policy. John Graham realized
that the justification for many of the health, safety, and

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. § 6(b)(2).
Id. § 6(b)(4)(D).
Id. § 6(a).
See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32397, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 10
(2009).
173. Id. at 19.
174. Id.
175. For a more detailed description of these events, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 247–54.
176. Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (1996), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html, with OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
CIRCULAR A–4 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
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environmental regulations that economists considered to be
inefficient arose from the “precautionary principle,” which holds that
government should not wait for scientific certainty to take action to
177
control emerging threats. By challenging the protective assumptions
government scientists had been making during the process of
assessing risk, Graham and his staff hoped to curtail regulation
without admitting that they were making policy decisions to take a
less rigorous approach toward emerging threats. Their efforts had
mixed results: OIRA intruded on all aspects of rulemaking with
impunity, but its effort to adopt government-wide guidance specifying
how agencies and departments should perform risk assessments was
repudiated by the National Academies of Science, among other
178
critics. Nevertheless, as the Bush II Administration trailed to a
close, OIRA was once again in the prominent, albeit controversial
role of riding herd on the agencies and departments—especially the
EPA—as those proposals were developed.
During his first presidential campaign, Barack Obama defined
the role of government as helping people when they cannot help
themselves, allowing progressives to hope that he would advocate
strong policies to reverse the deregulatory neglect of the Bush II
179
years. The newly elected President sent signals at the outset of his
Administration that he would implement such changes, selecting a
roster of experienced and well-respected appointees to head the
health, safety, and environmental agencies, especially Lisa Jackson at
the EPA. But the President’s enthusiasm waned as seemingly more
urgent problems competed for his attention. He did not fight for
badly needed increases in the EPA’s deflated budget nor did he
support his appointees when they were attacked by Republicans and
180
conservative Democrats. Most disturbing, he showed no enthusiasm

177. See, e.g., David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science,
109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 871–72 (2001).
178. Steinzor, supra note 23, at 249–51.
179. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, Closing Argument Speech at the Canton
Memorial
Civic
Center
(Oct.
27,
2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/10/obama_closing_argument_speech_1.html).
180. Modest increases in some agency budgets were proposed but were quickly eclipsed by
deficit politics, with the President hastening to make deals with Republicans and paving the way
for deep cuts in the funding available to implement those protections. See, e.g., Jim Efstathiou,
EPA Budget Cut Will Restrict Enforcement of Clean-Air Rules, Activists Say, BLOOMBERG.COM
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/epa-budget-cut-will-restrictenforcement-of-clean-air-rules-activists-say.html. The President has not defended the mission of
the agencies or the performance of the people he appointed to lead them in the face of
blistering Republican attacks on alleged overregulation, except in the context of explaining how
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for updating the outmoded laws that crippled agency efforts to curtail
181
chronic violations.
The President’s ambivalence towards these agencies was
crystallized in his appointment of Harvard Law School professor Cass
Sunstein as OIRA Administrator. Sunstein was well-known in
academic circles as a critic of the precautionary principle and a
182
supporter of quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Business groups and
183
conservative commentators hailed his appointment. And it was easy
to see why. In the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections, with
radical conservatives in the House of Representatives launching the
most withering campaign against the regulatory system since Newt
Gingrich’s 104th Congress, Sunstein helped President Obama pivot to
a new strategy that attempted to deflect the accusation that his
Administration was hostile to business by launching his own version
of a regulatory witch-hunt.

far he is willing to go to eliminate unnecessarily burdensome regulations. See, e.g., Alan Fram,
Obama’s Push to Revamp Regulations, WASH. POST, May 30, 2011, at A21 (“Overall, the drive
would save hundreds of millions of dollars annually for companies, governments and individuals
and eliminate millions of hours of paperwork while maintaining health and safety protections
for Americans, White House officials said.”).
181. The President was missing in action during congressional debate regarding legislation
to strengthen regulation of deepwater oil production and mine safety. This approach was
emblematic of the administration’s reluctance to put much political capital on the line in the
health, safety, and environmental arenas. See, e.g., Vicki Smith, MSHA to Congress: Mine Safety
Laws Need to Be Stronger, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/03/03/msha-congress-minesafety_n_830841.html (“MSHA chief Joe Main . . . told the
chairman, Republican Rep. Tim Walberg of Michigan, he was not recommending any particular
legislation.”).
182. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005). Laws of Fear is an attack on the precautionary principle, which Sunstein
describes as “literally incoherent” in “its strongest forms.” Id. at 4. He explains that the strong
form of this principle requires regulation “whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or
the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the economic
costs of regulation are high.” Id. at 24. He contends that powerful and irrational social forces
feed average citizens’ overreaction to risk. Because non-experts have difficulty factoring in the
probability that a risk would occur and instead panic in response to harm that has a very small
chance of occurring, “the public’s demand for government intervention can be greatly affected
by probability neglect, so that regulators may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely
because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low)
probability that dangers will ever come to fruition.” Id. at 69. Sunstein sees these reactions as so
extreme that he recommends keeping the public from influencing government decisions that
involve such risks: “[T]here is [a risk that] high levels of public participation in technical
domains [will] simply heighten public fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.” Cass R.
Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC,
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
183. See, e.g., David Frum, Is the Right Still Afraid of Cass Sunstein?, FRUMFORUM.COM
(May 26, 2011, 8:48 AM), http://www.frumforum.com/is-the-right-still-afraid-of-cass-sunstein/.
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In January 2011, President Obama took the unusual step of
publishing a Wall Street Journal column pledging to establish a “21stcentury” system that would eliminate “dumb” rules and avoid
184
“excessive, inconsistent, and redundant regulation.” New EO 13,563
followed on the heels of this pronouncement, directing agencies to
develop plans for identifying “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome” rules and “to modify, streamline, expand, or
185
repeal them.” The President reiterated these instructions in a
second EO a year later, further ordering agencies to move to the
front of the line any new rules that would reduce “cumulative”
186
regulatory burdens on a given industrial sector. Supervised closely
by OIRA administrator Sunstein, the agencies struggled to find
poster children for overregulation that, once identified and
publicized, would have the effect of admitting that the originating
187
agency had done some very stupid things in the past. Ironically,
despite the significant impact these initiatives had on slowing the
188
Obama Administration’s rulemaking efforts, conservative critics on
Capitol Hill and in the business community gave President Obama no

184. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2011, at A17; see also Cass Sunstein, Op-Ed., 21st-Century Regulation: An Update on the
President’s Reforms, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2011, at A17.
185. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821–22 (Jan. 18, 2011).
186. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012).
187. One excellent example of this pitiable yet damaging syndrome is the President’s 2012
State of the Union address that ridiculed an EPA “rule” requiring farmers to have a spill
prevention plan for large tanks containing milk. Barack Obama, President, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24
/remarks-president-state-union-address. Typically, such plans are required at facilities storing
potentially hazardous substances like crude oil so that if the tank fractures, the spill is contained
and does not run into rivers and streams. Milk was covered because in large quantities it could
harm water quality, although the EPA never enforced the rule and ultimately decided to
exempt the tanks because they were already required to be carefully monitored under
Department of Agriculture regulations. Regardless, the President gave people watching the
speech yet another reason to disdain regulations and regulatory agencies. See Cary Coglianese,
Taking Regulation Seriously, REGBLOG (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/
regblog/2012/01/taking-regulation-seriously.html.
188. For analyses of this slowdown, see generally AMY SINDEN, ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, TWELVE CRUCIAL HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS: WILL THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION FINISH ON TIME? (2011), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/12Rules_1106.pdf; RENA STEINZOR & JAMES
GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, OPPORTUNITY WASTED: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO ADOPT NEEDED REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS IN A TIMELY
WAY IS COSTING LIVES AND MONEY (2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/
12RulesIssueBrief.cfm.
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credit whatsoever for blunting the impact of “job killing”
189
regulation.
2. Coal Ash Protections and the “Stigma Effect”
Despite the impression created by its broad jurisdiction and
aggressive assertions of control over regulatory policy, OIRA is a
small office, with about three dozen “desk officers” and “branch
chiefs” responsible for reviewing some 700 regulatory matters
190
annually. OIRA reviews both proposed and final rules, and given
the complexity of many of these rules, its career employees use what
is best described as deterrence-based review: they single out a handful
of controversial rules for well-publicized attention, thereby signaling
that agencies better have covered all their cost-benefit bases and
placated their most committed industry foes long before their
paperwork hits the economists’ desks. Coal ash is a prominent
example of this strategy.
Almost as soon as rumors of the EPA’s ambitious proposal to
declare coal ash a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA hit K
Street, the de facto headquarters of the capitol’s business lobbyists,
opponents initiated an unprecedented siege on OIRA, demanding
191
help in suppressing Jackson and her staff. OIRA staff sat through
forty-seven separate meetings with organizational representatives
interested in the EPA proposal, an especially egregious number given
the ample opportunities that interested parties already had to explain
their reasoned, evidence-based opposition to the EPA in a
192
rulemaking record posted on the worldwide web. Two-thirds of
these meetings involved industry and state representatives opposing
the rule, while the remainder involved environmental groups
193
supporting it.

189. See Andrew Zajac, Agencies Told to Weigh Effects of Business Rules in the U.S.,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-20/agencies-toldto-weigh-effects-of-business-rules-in-u-s-.html (“The top regulatory official at the Washingtonbased U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s largest business-lobbying group, said Sunstein’s
office hasn’t listened to the group’s complaints about redundant rules.”).
190. COPELAND, supra note 172, at 28.
191. For a detailed description of these events, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 260–68.
192. See James Goodwin, Eye on OIRA: Coal Ash Meetings Up to 42, CPR BLOG (Apr. 5,
2010, 11:12 AM), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=CE877002-A1A5ADAC-34017AC4184F218A; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Solid Waste and Emergency
Response: Meeting Records, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_2050_meetings/.
193. See Goodwin, supra note 192; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 192.
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At least as troubling as this relentless lobbying blitz was TVA’s
involvement as a well-protected “interagency” stakeholder. Needless
to say, it also opposed the rule, joined by its colleagues at the
Department of Transportation, which spoke from its perspective as a
builder of highways using recycled coal ash, and the Department of
Energy, which stood up for electric utilities that own and operate
coal-fired power plants, one of its most important constituencies. All
three submitted informal comments trashing the EPA proposal to
OIRA, which wrote them up as confidential “interagency”
communications in direct contravention of the disclosure
194
requirements of EO 12,866. When EPA staff posted the interagency
comments on its web-based rulemaking docket, a power struggle
ensued; the document was briefly pulled off the web but then restored
with a notation that such a brazen disclosure mistake would never
195
happen again. As Professor Steinzor has written previously, federal
opponents of the coal ash proposal took on the features of a posse in
a classic western, riding to support the OIRA sheriff’s pursuit of the
196
outlaw EPA.
OIRA held onto the coal ash rule for seven months—well
beyond the ninety-day review period allotted under EO 12,866—
while it rewrote both the rulemaking notice and the EPA’s regulatory
197
impact statement. Finally, in May 2010, a fundamentally different
rulemaking notice emerged from OIRA, advancing three alternatives:
(1) EPA’s original option that coal ash be regulated as a RCRA
Subtitle C hazardous waste; (2) an approach that would treat coal ash
as a “solid” waste under RCRA Subtitle D when it is disposed on
land, essentially leaving all regulatory decisions and enforcement to
state discretion; and (3) a so-called “D prime” option that would
allow all existing coal ash disposal landfills and surface
impoundments to continue to function without change for the
198
remainder of their useful lives.

194. See EPA, Interagency Working Comments on Draft Rule Under EO 12866, at 1
(noting that these entities were contributors to the confidential process of commenting on draft
rules), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-20090640-0350.
195. For a more detailed description of this incident, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264.
196. Id. at 265.
197. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f.
198. The Federal Register notice setting forth these options only admits to two
alternatives, although it explicitly raises the third, minimally protective proposal, calling it the
“[subtitle] ‘D prime’ ” approach. 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,134 (June 21, 2010).
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We are convinced that raw political considerations lie at the
heart of this decision to back away from the EPA’s protective
approach, thereby muddying the waters on the final outcome and
sending the signal that the most stringent alternative was in deep
trouble. OIRA, however, invented an elaborate rationale for these
changes that invoked what has been one of Administrator Sunstein’s
central interests during his academic career—behavioral economics,
or the semi-scientific study of why people do not always appear to
behave as rational actors in certain decision-making contexts. As
applied to regulation, behavioral economists attempt to overcome
people’s irrational preferences, or “heuristics,” through various
techniques that often trump direct government efforts to curb
199
harmful industrial activities. As mentioned earlier, electric utilities
and their allies in the coal and construction industries focused their
opposition to the EPA proposal on the notion that it would create a
“stigma effect” that would destroy the recycling market because
consumers of the products containing the ash would be deterred from
buying the material by its designation as a hazardous waste when it
200
was simply disposed of in regulated landfills. As a result of the
stigma effect, electric utilities would be compelled to pay significantly
higher costs for disposal and their customers that now recycled coal
199. The benign version of Sunstein’s preoccupation with this field is the book he wrote
with Richard Thaler entitled Nudge, which argues that the government should exercise benign
paternalism by giving people options that are presented in a manner that overcomes their
natural tendencies to make the worst choices. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009). A
considerably darker version of this theory, which attributes much of the protective
environmental legislation enacted into law over the past three decades as unacceptably costly
because people are irrationally afraid of toxic exposures, is presented in Sunstein’s book, Laws
of Fear, published in 2005. SUNSTEIN, supra note 182. For example, Sunstein excoriates
residents of the Washington D.C. metropolitan area who tried desperately to stay out of the
path of the snipers who killed ten people in a rampage during the fall of 2002:
But there is something very odd about the extraordinary effects of the snipers’ actions.
For people in the area, the snipers caused a miniscule increase in risk. About 5 million
people live in that area. If the snipers were going to kill one person every three days,
the daily statistical risk was less than one in one million, and the weekly statistical risk
was less than three in one million. These are trivial risks, far lower than the risks
associated with many daily activities about which people do not express even the
slightest concern. The daily risk was smaller than the one in one million risk from
drinking 30 diet sodas with saccharin, driving 100 miles, smoking two cigarettes, taking
ten airplane trips, living in a home with a smoker for two weeks, living in Denver
rather than Philadelphia for 40 days, and eating 35 slices of fresh bread.
Id. at 90–91.
200. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR EPA’S PROPOSED RCRA
REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES (CCR) GENERATED BY THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY 10–12 (2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;
D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0003.
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ash would stop doing so and would instead be compelled to pay more
201
for virgin materials.
OIRA’s calculations of stigma costs in the Final Draft RIA came
out to a whopping $233.5 billion in negative, or lost, economic and
202
environmental benefits at the high end of its range of estimates. The
calculations assumed that if the strict EPA rule went into effect,
approximately fifty-one percent of coal ash that is now recycled—
some thirty-seven million tons—would be diverted to disposal in
203
2012, growing to about forty-one million tons annually by 2061. The
fifty-one percent assumption was never justified, and seemed at best
to be a stab in the dark. But this potentially enormous price tag was
extraordinary as these things go, and it hung an albatross around the
proposal’s neck that dragged it into the realm of the least possible.
Whether or not the lesson history takes from this episode is that
the EPA’s original, more stringent coal-ash proposal was killed for
political—as opposed to cost-benefit—reasons, the chilling effect that
this kind of far-fetched hypothesizing will have on the EPA and other
health and safety agencies should not be underestimated. For the first
204
time in our experience, OIRA took the position that (1) if an
agency declares an activity (disposing of CCRs in an unlined pit) or a
material (CCRs themselves) to be hazardous, (2) related industries
might change their conduct based on what economists believe to be
irrational anxieties about those decisions, and (3) those “irrational”
reactions might cost industry money over a 50-year period, then (4)
the agency must quantify the costs of this stigma effect and (5) add
them to the other costs of the action, all of which may (6) force the
agency to pull back or terminate its efforts to protect public health.
Virtually any decision to consider how toxic an under-tested chemical
may be and whether its use should be restricted, to control the
disposal of any harmful waste, or to require new performance
standards for facilities that release pollutants into the environment
could be found to have a stigmatizing effect on some aspect of
commerce. This would trigger elaborate calculations of the effect’s
economic burden that could swamp the calculations of the benefit of
regulatory controls. Given the power of this chilling effect on health,

201. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264–69.
202. EPA, supra note 200, at 11, Exhibit 6, 187–88, Exhibit 5C-21 (2010).
203. 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,128.
204. We share a combined seven decades of working within, observing, and critically
analyzing the regulatory system that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and
the environment.
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safety, and environmental regulation, the record built by OIRA with
respect to the stigma effect is shallow to the point of irresponsibility.
The Final Draft RIA does not contain any citations to sources
describing how behavioral scientists define and evaluate the so-called
stigma effect. It acknowledges, again without citation, that to the
extent behavioral scientists have tried to quantify the stigma effect,
they have never documented the drastic reduction assumed by
OIRA’s redraft—which is, that sales of recycled coal ash will drop by
205
fifty percent. Instead, stigma is accepted as a given not on the basis
of previous, well-informed research and analysis but because affected
206
industries intent on killing the EPA proposal claim it will occur. An
academic literature on the stigma effect exists, but OIRA’s
economists apparently chose to ignore it.
It turns out that an impressive roster of behavioral scientists have
published an entire book analyzing the stigma effect through the
prism of well-publicized controversies involving the contamination of
food (mad cow disease or the discovery of polychlorinated biphenyls
in milk) or drugs (tampering with Tylenol), the siting of nuclear207
waste-disposal facilities, and toxic-waste dump sites. The authors
define stigma as people’s revulsion against substances or practices
208
that could prove harmful to their health.
In one famous experiment, researchers dipped a “sterilized”
cockroach in a glass of juice while their human subjects watched, and
then asked people to drink from the glasses; most refused all such
209
requests. Similar experiments involving poisoned Tylenol and the
tainted milk and meat that may derive from mad cows unsurprisingly

205. EPA, supra note 200, at 157–59.
206. Id. at 157 (“On the other hand, industry and state government stakeholders have
asserted in letters to EPA, that regulation of CCR as a RCRA ‘hazardous waste’ will impose a
‘stigma’ on CCR beneficial use which will significantly curtail these uses. In their view, even an
action that regulates only the disposal of CCR in landfills or surface impoundments as
hazardous waste, but retains the Bevill exemption for beneficial uses, would have this effect.”).
207. PAUL SLOVIC ET AL., RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC
CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA].
208. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Defining Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra
note 207, at 361 (defining stigma as the “refusal to engage in an act that would otherwise be
acceptable”); Robin Gregory et al., Technological Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra
note 207, at 296.
209. Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study of Contagion, in
RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 31–33.
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provided similar results: the average person exhibits revulsion over
210
the contamination and is anxious to avoid exposure.
Perhaps the OIRA economists ignored this research because the
reaction of people asked to drink a contaminated beverage on its face
has very little to do with how electric utilities respond to any
regulation that could cost them money. One situation simply has very
little to do with the other. It is tempting to surmise, however, that to
the extent that they were familiar with this research, the OIRA
economists did not want to highlight the behavioral scientists’
recommended solutions to the stigma effect. To a person, the
scientists urge government to combat stigma with public education,
efforts to restore trust in government, and—ultimately—more
211
protective regulation. Had OIRA absorbed the research and these
recommendations—had it, in fact, maintained an open mind and
followed the implications of the behavioral research to its logical
conclusion—the upshot might very well have been to either dismiss
the stigma effect altogether or, at the very least, to assign it a much
lower number. Instead, playing into the industry’s strategy for killing
the rule, OIRA ensured that EPA and Congress received the clear
message that the rule was on shaky footing within the Obama
Administration, and therefore vulnerable to the final stage of bloodsport policymaking.
C. Advertising and Astroturf
A coalition of coal and utility companies spent around thirty-five
million dollars on television advertising criticizing several EPA
212
regulatory proposals, including the coal-ash rule. One ad featured a
businessman with a briefcase struggling to stay aboard a bucking bull
while the narrator observed that “too many Americans are just trying
to hang onto their jobs” and wondered why the EPA was “in a rush to

210. Michael R. Edelstein, Crying over Spoiled Milk: Contamination, Visibility, and
Expectation in Environmental Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 41–68;
Douglas Powell, Mad Cow Disease and the Stigmatization of British Beef, in RISK, MEDIA, AND
STIGMA, supra note 207, at 219–28; Mark L. Mitchell, The Impact of External Parties on BrandName Capital: The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, in RISK, MEDIA, AND
STIGMA, supra note 207, at 203–17.
211. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Coping with Stigma: Challenges and
Opportunities, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 331, 334.
212. See Daniel J. Weiss, Poor Little Big Coal Says EPA Smog Standards Too Expensive,
GRIST.ORG (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.grist.org/coal/2011-11-17-poor-little-big-coal-says-epasmog-standards-too-expensive; Anna Palmer & David Levinthal, Energy Wars, POLITICO.COM
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.politico.com/politicoinfluence/0811/politicoinfluence74.html.
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push regulations that would saddle Americans with higher energy
costs and throw even more of us out of work?” The narrator then
213
urged the viewer to tell Congress that “EPA needs to slow down.”
As it became clear that the EPA was serious about regulating
coal ash as a hazardous waste, a group called Citizens for Recycling
First appeared on the scene. Run by a consultant for the coal-ash
recycling industry, it was an “Astroturf” group established by the
industry to create the impression that ordinary citizens strongly
opposed regulation of coal ash as a hazardous waste. In October 2011,
the group took advantage of the White House’s “We the People”
program to submit a petition demanding that the Obama
214
Administration not designate coal ash as a hazardous waste. The
group’s website boasted that the petition had attracted more than
5,000 signatures, but a closer examination by the Environmental
Integrity Project found that the names were probably generated by “a
215
piece of software or a small group of individuals.”
D. Congress Strides Backwards
As is becoming standard operating procedure in high-stakes
rulemaking, the industry coalition opposing the EPA rule did not
limit its work to the traditional strategies of lobbying EPA and OIRA
officials and preparing voluminous comments on the Notice of
216
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Instead, its lobbyists fanned out
across Capitol Hill, asking members from states where affected
companies were located to find ways to delay or terminate the
rulemaking. This new strategy was significantly more effective
following the 2010 midterm elections.

213. America’s Power, Rodeo: The EPA Needs to Slow Down, YOUTUBE.COM (Sept. 9,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xheNqLlhhFc.
214. See White House Petition Drive Reaches Goal!, CITIZENS FOR RECYCLING FIRST (Oct.
25, 2011), http://www.recyclingfirst.org/blog/?post=126.
215. Meet Coal Ash’s Fake New Chinese Friends: “Big Steamed Bun” and “Handsome
Dragon,” ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT (June 28, 2012), http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/
news_reports/06_28_2012.php. At least eighty of the names identified in Chinese characters
referred to “objects or descriptions” like “Steamed Bun, Older Sister, Steamed Bun Little
Sister, Small Steamed Bun, etc.” Id.
216. For discussions of these blood sport strategies in other contexts, see generally
McGarity, supra note 32 (considering the battle over debit card fees); Rena Steinzor, The Age of
Greed and the Sabotage of Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(describing these tactics in the context of a Department of Labor rulemaking proposal updating
forty-year-old hazard orders prohibiting children who work on farms from engaging in certain
activities).
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The scene was set for such congressional intervention during the
2010 midterm elections, when candidates put forth by the Tea Party
faction of the Republican Party routinely blamed many of the
217
nation’s economic problems on environmental regulation. Whether
or not these attacks had a decisive effect on the final vote, the
electorate returned control of the House of Representatives to a
Republican Party with a vocal Tea Party faction that was determined
to prevent the EPA from promulgating more regulations. The mining
and electric-utility industries contributed heavily to Republican
candidates who took an anti-regulatory stance, and they were
218
delighted with these election results.
The coal and electric-utility industries hoped to persuade
Congress either to prevent the EPA from finalizing pending
regulations or, if that approach failed, to force the agency to make the
219
regulations it did finalize less burdensome. In response to a request
by Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) to nominate supposedly “jobthreatening” regulations for repeal or withdrawal, thirteen different
220
trade associations nominated the coal-ash rule. During the first nine
months of 2011, mining interests spent $16.5 million and electric
utility interests spent $78.4 million on this and related lobbying
221
activities. Members of the American Public Power Association, a
trade group representing publicly owned utilities in cities like
Anaheim and Nashville, assembled in Washington, D.C. in early
March 2011 to take their grievances about the EPA rules directly to
222
individual members of Congress.
The industry lobbyists were well-received by the Republican
House majority. The tone of the congressional hearings on coal ash
shifted dramatically as Republican chairpersons controlled the
witness list. They stacked the hearings with industry representatives,
and subjected EPA witnesses to lengthy, hostile questioning that

217. Stephen Power, Not on Ballot, but EPA Chief a Campaign Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8,
2010, at A4.
218. John M. Broder, Coal Industry Spending to Sway Next Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2010, at A12.
219. Philip Rucker & David S. Hilzenrath, House GOP targets Obama regulations, WASH.
POST, Feb. 7, 2011, at A1.
220. Id.
221. Manuel Quinones, Coal Industry Deploys Donations, Lobbying as Its Issues Gain
Prominence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/13/
13greenwire-coal-industry-deploys-donations-lobbying-as-it-45582.html?pagewanted=all.
222. Lynn Garner, EPA Plan to Limit Emissions Said to Pose “Imminent Threat” to CoalFired Power Plants, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 426 (2011).
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223

sometimes pressed the boundaries of congressional decorum.
Sympathetic members supported stand-alone bills to divest the EPA
of authority to regulate many aspects of power plant pollution,
including coal ash. The Republican leadership was also receptive to
attempts to circumvent the normal procedures for enacting legislation
by attaching the contents of stand-alone bills to “must-pass”
legislation, such as appropriations and transportation-reauthorization
legislation, which was not likely to be killed in the Senate or vetoed
by President Obama.
The first opportunity for Congress to halt EPA rulemaking was
the continuing resolution that had to pass at the outset of the 112th
Congress to appropriate funds for the government agencies for the
224
remainder of the 2011 fiscal year. Because President Obama would
be very reluctant to veto the bill, triggering a government shutdown
until a new continuing resolution could be passed, the legislation was
virtually veto-proof. It did, however, have to get through the
Democrat-controlled Senate. When the continuing resolution came to
the floor of the House for a vote, Representative David McKinley (RWV) offered a so-called “limitation” rider to prevent the EPA from
expending any of the appropriated funds for the purpose of
225
classifying coal ash as a hazardous waste. This restriction would
have effectively terminated the coal-ash rulemaking for the
remainder of the fiscal year. Whether the agency could resume the
rulemaking at the end of FY 2011 would depend on whether the FY
2012 appropriation contained a similar rider. The full House
approved the rider, along with a number of other riders aimed at
terminating ongoing EPA rulemaking initiatives. But the final deal on
the continuing resolution reached among the Speaker of the House,
Senate leaders, and President Obama removed the rider from the
226
bill. Environmental groups breathed a sigh of relief, although they
realized that the continuing resolution battle was just “an opening
227
act” for future battles over EPA rules.

223.
224.

See McGarity, supra note 32, at 1726.
See Senate Democrats Vow to Drop EPA Policy Measures from FY11 Budget Bill,
INSIDE EPA (Feb. 25, 2011), http://environmentalnewsstand.com/Inside-EPA/Inside-EPA02/25/2011/menu-id-298.html (follow link to article).
225. 157 Cong. Rec. H. 1318, 1342 (2011).
226. Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Riders Are Out of Spending Bill, But Analysts Say Battle Is Far
from Over, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 816 (Apr. 15, 2011).
227. Id. (quoting Marty Hayden, Earthjustice).
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Later that month, the Subcommittee on Environment and the
Economy of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a
hearing on a free-standing bill entitled the Recycling Coal
Combustion Residuals Accessibility Act. That Act would have
prohibited the EPA from regulating coal ash as a hazardous waste
228
and given the states authority to regulate the disposal of CCRs. The
hearing featured testimony by EPA Assistant Administrator Mathy
Stanislaus who told the committee that the problems with CCR
retention ponds “could be addressed easily if disposal units were
installed with proper liners, groundwater monitoring, and fugitive
229
dust controls with an effective government oversight framework.”
Underscoring the fact that the rule would not regulate beneficial uses
of coal ash in any way, he stressed the need for “an effective oversight
role to ensure CCR regulations are properly implemented and
230
enforced.” He said that the agency preferred to consider all of the
possible regulatory options, including regulating coal ash as a
hazardous waste, and he complained that the bill would take that
231
option away from the agency.
Throughout the hearing, Republican congressmen took
Stanislaus to task for the agency’s failure to conduct an economic
analysis that specifically focused on jobs in addition to the extensive
economic analysis contained in the Draft RIA for the proposed
232
rule. Representative Cory Gardner (R-CO) berated Stanislaus for
analyzing the impact of the rule on environmental justice, but not the
233
impact on jobs. When Representative David McKinley (R-WV)
pressed Stanislaus to give his opinion as to whether coal ash was
toxic, Stanislaus pointed out that the agency was “in the middle of a
rulemaking,” and the toxicity of coal ash was one of the issues that
234
the rulemaking would resolve. Alluding to the stigmatizing effect of
regulating CCRs under Subtitle C, Representative McKinley then
demanded to know what “corporate liability lawyers” would “tell
companies about creating wall board for use in homes, hazardous

228. The Recycling Coal Combustion Residuals Accessibility Act of 2011: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Env’t and the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong.,
1st Sess. (2011) (Testimony of Mathy Stanislaus, EPA), at 6.
229. Id. at 8.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 8.
232. See id. at 16–18, 44–46, 50–51.
233. Id. at 50.
234. Id. at 51.
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235

material.” Stanislaus tried to explain again—to no avail—that the
EPA proposal exempted recycled coal ash used in products like
wallboard and that the central issue for the rulemaking was the
characteristics of coal ash when mismanaged in a retention pond and
236
not its characteristics when put to beneficial uses.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out the
legislation, now titled the Coal Residuals Reuse and Management
Act, in mid-July 2011. It divested the EPA of its authority to regulate
CCRs and set forth general standards for state regulation of disposal
237
sites. The EPA would retain the authority to seek an injunction to
prevent an imminent hazard, but it would lack inspection and
enforcement authority over the old dump sites like the surface
238
impoundment that collapsed at Kingston. As the bill came up for a
floor vote, the White House issued a statement opposing the measure,
239
but stopped short of threatening a veto. The full House approved
240
the bill by a vote of 267 to 144 on October 14, 2011. According to
House speaker John Boehner, the vote demonstrated that
Republicans were fulfilling their promise to stop the Obama
241
Administration from issuing regulations that threatened jobs. But
two weeks after the House passed the legislation, a bluff at the We
Energies’ power plant adjacent to Lake Michigan in Oak Creek,
Wisconsin gave way and discharged 2,500 cubic yards of soil
242
contaminated with coal ash into Lake Michgan. Perhaps influenced
by this episode, Democrats on the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works did not even schedule a hearing for
the House legislation.
House advocates soon discovered another must-pass piece of
legislation: the transportation-reauthorization bill. They approved a
rider containing the text of the coal-ash bill they had previously
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Avery Fellow, Energy and Commerce Clears Bill to Give States Regulatory Authority
Over Coal Ash, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1577 (July 15, 2011).
238. Id.
239. Dean Scott, House Rules Panel Clears Coal Ash Bill for Floor Action; White House
Hints at Veto, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2301 (Oct. 14, 2011).
240. Dean Scott, House Clears Bill to Strip EPA Authority over Coal Ash, Give States
Primary Role, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2349 (Oct. 21, 2011).
241. Id.
242. Meg Jones & Don Behm, Bluff Collapse at Power Plant Sends Dirt, Coal Ash into
Lake,
MILWAUKE-WISCONSIN
JOURNAL
SENTIAL
ONLINE,
Oct.
31,
2011,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/authorities-investigate-bluff-collapse-at-we-energiesplant-132929538.html.

McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2012]

12/17/2012 2:51 PM

THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION

135

243

passed as a stand-alone measure. Hoping that the Senate would not
remove the rider in the conference committee, industry coalition
244
lobbyists visited each of the individual conferees. They also
succeeded in persuading eighty-one representatives to sign a letter to
the House conferees urging them to insist that the rider be retained in
245
the conference committee’s bill. The Utility Solid Waste Activities
Group created a website called “Regulate Coal Ash Right” to appeal
to citizens to “tell Congress to include bipartisan coal ash provisions
246
in the surface transportation bill.” It was all for naught, however, as
the Democratic senators on the conference committee refused to go
247
forward with a bill containing the rider.
Meanwhile, after suffering defeats at OIRA and Congress,
environmental groups sought refuge in the courts, filing an “agency
forcing” lawsuit against the EPA seeking a court order requiring the
248
agency to issue a final coal-ash rule by a prescribed deadline. The
largest manufacturer of CCRs for beneficial use filed its own lawsuit
and asked that it be consolidated with the environmental groups’
249
suit. Fearing that the EPA would settle the lawsuit on terms
favorable to the environmental groups, the chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce and the chairman of its
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy wrote a letter to
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson urging her not to settle the
250
litigation. In late June 2012, two industry groups intervened in the
251
lawsuit so that they would be parties to any settlement negotiations.

243. Anthony Adragna, House Approves Coal Ash Amendment Delegating Regulatory
Authority to States, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1014 (Apr. 20, 2012).
244. Id.; Anthony Adragna, Environmental, Industry Groups Prepare for Transportation
Bill Fight Over Coal Ash, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1080 (Apr. 27, 2012).
245. Anthony Adragna, 81 House Members Urge Conferees to Keep Coal Ash Provisions in
Transportation Bill, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1347 (May 25, 2012).
246. Id.
247. Anthony Adragna, Final Transportation Bill Includes Provisions to Streamline
Environmental Review Process, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1694 (June 29, 2012).
248. Anthony Adragna, Environmental Groups File Lawsuit Against EPA to Force Coal
Ash Regulation, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 889 (Apr. 6, 2012).
249. Anthony Adragna, Manufacturer of Coal Ash Products Files Lawsuit Seeking
Deadline on EPA Final Rule, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1014 (Apr. 20, 2012).
250. Anthony Adragna, Republicans Urge EPA Not to Settle with Environmental Groups
on Coal Ash, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 458 (Feb. 24, 2012).
251. Anthony Adragna, Electric Utility, Mining Groups Intervene in EPA Lawsuit Over
Coal Ash Regulation, 43 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1684 (June 29, 2012).
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Although Congress has not yet enacted legislation cutting off the
coal-ash rulemaking, several near misses suggest the battle is likely to
be renewed after the 2012 national elections.
IV. LESSONS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Lessons
1. Disasters with No Response
As we mentioned at the outset, widely publicized, anthropogenic
disasters can create a crisis atmosphere capable of opening policymaking “windows,” as the political scientist John Kingdon described
252
the delicate point in time when all factors are aligned toward action.
Regulatory agencies always have many more issues on their plates
than they can possibly address with their limited resources; and they
are increasingly intimidated by the gauntlet they must run to push
proposals that well-connected industries oppose through centralized
White House review. Congress must struggle to overcome its own
inertia on regulatory issues; the laws are complex and their
reauthorization has always inspired similarly intense resistance from
253
regulated industries. Historically, disasters have cut through these
Gordian knots, largely because they provided progressive activists
with the grassroots momentum needed to overcome the “collective
254
action” problem identified by economist Mancur Olson.
The costs of complying with regulations are borne directly by the
regulated industries, while the benefits of regulatory protections are
spread among thousands or millions of individuals, no single one of
whom has a strong enough incentive to seek regulatory change aimed
255
at internalizing those costs. But disgust at the sight of the Cuyahoga
River on fire, or fear that an American chemical plant could erupt
with the lethal effect of the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India,
historically served to galvanize enough public support for
environmental protection laws that the EPA and Congress were

252. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(2nd ed., 1997).
253. Most of the major health, safety, and environmental statutes have not been
reauthorized in at least two decades. The major exceptions are the increasingly rare instances
when they were updated in reaction to the kinds of disasters we mention here.
254. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
255. DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN
AMERICA 38 (1989).
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compelled to respond.
Members of Congress moved toward
compromise, although the resulting legislation may be too narrow or
weak to empower the relevant agency to prevent the next tragedy.
Until recently, a catastrophe of the order of magnitude of the
Kingston spill would have pushed an issue to the front of the
policymaking agenda. As the national media focused on the causes of
the tragedy, advocates for the victims pointed to regulatory failures or
the inadequacy of statutes designed to prevent a second catastrophe,
generating an opportunity to pressure agencies and members of
257
Congress into a meaningful response. But the Kingston disaster,
along with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Upper Big Branch
mine tragedy, did not follow this long-standing historical trend. As
always, victims demanded action, the media reported on the human
misery left in the wake of the three events, and Congress—at least
initially—decried industry negligence, goaded regulators, and
demanded a response. Yet Congress did not enact legislation and
regulators who tried to respond were stymied.
Whether these developments mark a new, diametrically opposed
trend or a brief departure from the usual response is impossible to
determine with certainty. But we fear that the deep polarization of
the nation’s public affairs suggests that the human, natural, and
economic costs of such fiascos may need to rise sharply higher before
dysfunctional executive and legislative branches kick back into gear.
In this final section, we explain our prognosis and suggest the
conditions that would be necessary to prove us wrong.
We are well aware, of course, that participants in regulated
industries and their political allies believe that the reason the White
House and Congress fail to act is that a regulatory response is not
warranted on the merits. We reject that explanation. Instead, we
believe that the sharp imbalance of economic power that gives
regulated industries a louder voice than ordinary citizens and public
interest groups in both the legislative and regulatory fora lies at the
root of these changes. This imbalance reached its tipping point with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election

256. See Michael Scott, Cuyahoga River Fire Galvanized Clean Water and the Environment
as a Public Issue, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.cleveland.com/science/index.ssf/2009/04/cuyahoga_river_fire_galvanized.html;
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, What is the Toxics Release Inventory Program?, http://www.epa.gov/
tri/triprogram/whatis.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2012).
257. MCGARITY, supra note 23, at 22–23.
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Commission, which raised the stakes for political fundraising from
business entities to an unprecedented level. This trend toward
industry dominance not just of the traditional administrative process,
but of political arenas as well, is compounded by the public’s loss of
trust in government, a phenomenon that makes galvanizing public
sentiment for law reform extraordinarily difficult.
2. Industry Dominance of the Process
Empirical studies demonstrate that regulated parties dominate
every stage of the rulemaking process, from pre-proposal negotiations
with the agency over the content of the rule, to submission of
comments on the proposal, to judicial challenges of the final rule.
Because public interest groups have lagged far behind their industry
counterparts in effort and intensity, the agencies are under
tremendous pressure to default to proposals that weaken regulatory
requirements.
The Center for Public Integrity discovered that industry groups
opposed to climate change legislation hired four lobbyists for every
individual member of Congress, for a total of approximately 2,340
such representatives, compared to the 185 fielded by public interest
259
groups. This dominance on Capitol Hill is mirrored by higher rates
of industry participation in administrative proceedings. A survey of
Washington-based interest groups found that individual businesses
participated in over twice the number of rulemakings as other types
260
of organizations. Another study, examining comments filed on
eleven proposed regulations at three agencies, found the same
261
Corporations, public utilities, and trade
business dominance.
associations filed between 66.7% and 100% of the comments
concerning EPA and National Highway Traffic Administration rules,
and public interest groups did not file any comments regarding five of
262
the eight rules included in the study.

258. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
259. Marianne Lavelle, The Climate Change Lobby Explosion: Will Thousands of Lobbyists
Imperil Action on Global Warming?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/node/4593.
260. Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making:
A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 361 (2005).
261. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who
Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 250, 252 (1998).
The three agencies were the EPA, the NHTSA, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
262. Id.
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In the fall of 2011, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), an
organization that we helped found, released the most ambitious
empirical study of White House regulatory review yet conducted,
covering 6,194 separate regulatory proposals and final rules
263
considered during the period from October 16, 2001 to June 1, 2011.
Over the course of the decade, OIRA officials met 1,080 times with
264
5,759 participants. Sixty-five percent of attendees represented
industry, about five times the number of people who appeared on
265
behalf of public interest groups. The EPA was given attention far
disproportionate to its regulatory output: a surprising 442 of the 1,080
meetings involved regulatory matters that originated at the EPA even
though the agency accounted for only eleven percent of the matters
266
that OIRA reviewed. Most troubling of all, CPR discovered that
OIRA changes eighty-four percent of EPA rules and sixty-five
267
percent of all other rules before releasing them to the public.
Not surprisingly, as the coal-ash rulemaking demonstrates,
industry dominance of the process has a discernible impact on
rulemaking outcomes. One recent study of EPA rules regulating
hazardous air pollutants concluded that changes to the substance of
rules in response to public comments favored industry by a five-to268
one margin. Professor David Driesen examined twenty-five rules
identified by a GAO study as significantly affected by centralized
review, concluding that OIRA-recommended changes reduced
regulatory protections with respect to twenty-four of the rules, while
269
the one remaining change was neutral.
Industry advocates in many high-stakes rulemakings are now
willing to spend millions of dollars to achieve their regulatory goals
by lobbying agency staff and members of Congress. They employ
non-traditional tactics such as public relations campaigns replete with

263. RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf.
264. Id. at 5.
265. Id. at 8.
266. Id. at 9.
267. Id. at 4.
268. Golden, supra note 261, at 245; Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Regulations, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 99, 128–30 (2011) (noting a five to one margin).
269. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 366
(2006).
AT THE
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attack advertising, coordination with think tanks, media pundits, and
270
bloggers. These blood-sport strategies, several of which were on full
display during the EPA’s coal-ash rulemaking, go a long way toward
explaining the failure of Congress and the EPA to put protective laws
271
and regulations into place in the wake of the Kingston disaster.
If we are right that corporate dominance of national
policymaking in the health and safety arena is the most important
reason for the failure to respond to disasters, why have the American
people failed to respond more sharply to what many would regard to
be a corrupt state of affairs in the American political economy?
3. Loss of the Public Trust
No one was killed in the Kingston disaster, and only a few homes
were destroyed. The damage was limited to a few hundred acres of
land and a couple of rivers. Mayhem of this magnitude is available on
almost a daily basis as television outlets operating on a 24-7 news
cycle search for stories dramatic enough to attract viewers. A
constant diet of disasters may have rendered the American public
incapable of either empathy with the victims or outrage over the
callous disregard for public safety displayed by the corporate actors
who caused the harm. This sense of ennui may well have been
exacerbated by government’s failure to provide adequate protective
responses to serious crises so many times in the past decade—
Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Upper Big
Branch mining explosion—that people no longer trust government to
respond when catastrophes provide dramatic examples of the failure
of self-regulation, which is the only alternative to government
272
regulation.
In our view, the current distrust of governmental solutions to
social problems has at least three sources. First, thirty years of
debilitating attacks on government by the conservative media echochamber and irresponsible congressional leaders have convinced
many Americans that government officials are by nature less
competent and more corruptible than their equivalents in the private
273
274
sector. Dubbed “bureaucracy bashing” by political scientists, this

270. McGarity, supra note 32, at 1703–18.
271. Id. at 1708–09.
272. See Ron Fournier & Sophie Quinton, In Nothing We Trust, NAT’L JOURNAL, Apr. 21,
2012, at 17.
273. See David A. Farenthold & Juliet Eilperin, Historic Oil Spill Fails to Produce Gains for
U.S. Environmentalists, WASH. POST, July 12, 2010, at A1.
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practice has “when all else fails, kick the dog” overtones because it
involves blaming bureaucrats every time something goes wrong that
could conceivably fall within the government’s authority to
accomplish or prevent. This narrative is especially disturbing when it
combines the American commitment to individual freedom with the
suggestion that government employees are determined to deprive
their fellow citizens of their liberty. An extreme example is House
Majority Whip Tom DeLay’s attempt on the floor of the House to
275
equate EPA officials with the Gestapo. Although this comparison
may have lost some of its potency through constant, mindless
repetition, its use by a prominent national official should be
exceptionally disturbing to those familiar with the ghastly events of
the Holocaust.
And we are not alone. The DeLay comment was made in 1995,
the same year that Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In a moving speech paying
homage to the 168 victims of the attack, President Clinton said: “there
is nothing patriotic about hating your country or pretending that you
276
can love your country but despise your Government.” Although the
President was specifically referring to local militias, at least one
scholar before us, Professor Thad Hall, has argued that he was
drawing a link between bureaucracy bashing in Congress and this
277
stunning act of violence against the civil service.
Second, putting aside the argument that such extreme attitudes
are quite dangerous to the body politic, the varying degrees of disdain
for government officials among members of the public have produced
a serious brain drain among the civil service as well as deep cuts in its
ranks. This has in turn further alienated citizens, who no longer
identify public service as a noble calling. The National Commission
for the Public Service, chaired by the estimable Paul Volcker, former
274. See, e.g., Larry Hubbell, Ronald Reagan as Presidential Symbol Maker: The
FederalBureaucrat as Loafer, Incompetent Buffoon, Good Ole Boy, and Tyrant, 21 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 237, 244 (1991).
275. See Bruce Burkhard, Year in Review: Congress vs. Environment; Environmental Laws
Suffer under GOP-Controlled Congress, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 29, 1995),
http://www.cnn.com/EARTH/9512/congress_enviro/ (noting that“[t]he EPA, the Gestapo of
government, pure and simply has been one of the major clawholds that the government has
maintained on the backs of our constituents," said the majority whip, Rep. Tom DeLay, RTexas).
276. President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Michigan State University Commencement
Ceremony in East Lansing, Michigan 645 (May 5, 1995).
277. Thad E. Hall, Live Bureaucrats and Dead Public Servants: How People in Government
Are Discussed on the Floor of the House, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 242, 248 (2002).
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chair of the Federal Reserve Board, addressed this reality in 2003
without mincing any words:
Trust in government—strong after World War II, with the United
States assuming international leadership and meeting domestic
challenges—has eroded. Government’s responsiveness, its
efficiency, and too often its honesty are broadly challenged as we
enter a new century. The bonds between our citizens and our public
servants, essential to democratic government, are frayed even as
the responsibilities of government at home and abroad have
increased. Government work ought to be a respected source of
pride. All too frequently it is not. . . . The notion of public service,
once a noble calling proudly pursued by the most talented
Americans of every generation, draws an indifferent response from
today’s young people and repels many of the country’s leading
278
private citizens.

Finally, thirty years of budget cuts and debilitating ideological
attacks on regulatory agencies have rendered them incapable of
279
delivering the protections that we rightly expect. The EPA, which
started out on such a positive and energetic note after Kingston, was
ultimately beaten into submission, at least for the foreseeable future.
People are not wrong, of course, when they express
disillusionment with the government’s performance, especially during
a crisis. But disappointment does not have to lead to distrust. Longstanding Washington Post columnist and reporter, Jim Hoagland,
once wrote:
Americans distrust government’s powers and motives. They
immediately get the joke that has a federal inspector or a state
administrator fatuously saying, “We’re from the government and
here to help.” Such suspicion is a healthy instinct—but one that is
280
being carried to destructive and demagogic lengths.

If any country in the world is equipped to maintain both a healthy
suspicion of and a sense of humor about government, all without
succumbing to ideologues who are trying to destroy its capacity to
protect those who need the help, it is this one, however far the ship of
state has rolled to the intemperate starboard in recent years.

278. PAUL A. VOLCKER, BROOKINGS INST., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA:
REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY iii, 1 (2003), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2003/01governance/01governance.pdf.
279. Eric Liu & Nick Hanauer, The More What, Less How Government, DEMOCRACY J.
25–26
(Winter
2011),
available
at
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/19/LIUHANAUER.pdf
280. Jim Hoagland, Dissing Government, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B7.
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B. Solutions
1. Restoring Public Trust
The foregoing explanations for the failure of either Congress or
the EPA to provide an effective response to the Kingston catastrophe
may leave the reader wondering what can stimulate protective
governmental action if crises generated by dramatic disasters are no
longer capable of doing so. If our society cannot learn from the
mistakes that become apparent in the most extreme catastrophes,
how can it possibly avoid their future recurrence? And if government
has become so ineffective that it can no longer require risk-fraught
industries to prevent these events, to what institutions can the
potential victims of the next disaster turn?
To a large degree, we share this feeling of helplessness, but we
take some comfort in the fact that identifying the cause of a disease is
the first step toward deriving a cure. In this part of the Article we do
not pretend to have a cure, and the suggestions that we offer here
may seem quixotic to some. But we offer them as a first step on the
way back to a political economy in which anthropogenic disasters are
less frequent and government reacts to the disasters that do occur by
putting into place regulatory programs designed to prevent similar
disasters in the future.
We believe that very little progress toward effective
governmental responses to environmental disasters is likely if we do
not first restore public trust in the ability of government to address
social problems. And the first step toward restoring public trust is to
rebuild the governmental institutions that have the responsibility to
protect people from environmental disasters. At the same time,
supporters of proactive governmental intervention must displace the
business community’s well-honed, anti-government narrative with a
compelling counter-narrative capable of restoring public trust in
281
government.
2. Rebuilding Government
Regulatory agencies like the EPA have little chance of regaining
either their self-respect or the power to control corporate misconduct
unless the White House and Congress remove themselves from the
arena where regulatory decisions, guided by decades of carefully

281. JEROME ARMSTRONG & MARKOS MOULITSAS, CRASHING THE GATE 38, 51 (2006);
DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 234 (1993).
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crafted law, were meant to be made. Doors must shut all over
Washington, D.C. The simple act, in all its iterations, of appealing to
the administrator of OIRA or the chair of an agency’s congressional
appropriations subcommittee must become an outlier that has an
appropriate smell of corruption each time a well-heeled corporate
282
lobbyist attempts to travel that route. Or, to put it another way, the
blood-sport approach to influencing regulatory decisions must come
to an end.
We have two tough audiences to convince that these new tools,
so treasured by the people that use them, will bring all of us to a bad
end: (1) the thousands of tacticians who earn good livings deploying
their blood-sport strategies and the senior corporate executives who
sponsor their activities and (2) the political advisers to the president.
Our message has three parts. First, in regulatory wars of
attrition, with constantly increasing sums of money needed to derail
rulemaking initiatives, the first victims may be the hapless millions of
people who live near coal-ash dumps or who have Chinese drywall in
their homes. Sooner or later, though, industries will end up squaring
off against other industries, and the cost of the battles will spiral out
of control. In a recent article outlining blood-sport strategies,
Professor McGarity describes an extremely expensive and chaotic
fight between bankers and retailers over debit card fees that punished
283
both sides and left neither the clear victor.
One mainstay in the business community’s argument against
regulation is that, to compete effectively in a global marketplace,
companies need a degree of certainty that constantly changing rules
do not provide. Yet the business community is far more dependent on
the stability that a mature regulatory program can provide than its
representatives generally care to admit. Even in the era of shrunken
government envisioned by Fredrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman,
and Grover Norquist, governmental regulation will persist to make
and enforce the rules that make markets possible by providing a level
competitive playing field and by giving consumers confidence that
they and their families will not be cheated or injured by irresponsible

282. See generally Archive of Articles on the Keating Five, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/subjects/k/keating_five/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). Our frame
of reference here is the backlash against the Keating Five, a group of Senators who tried to
deflect a Federal Home Loan Bank Board investigation of a company owned by a political
contributor. Interference in the regulatory process by Congress should be no less troubling.
283. McGarity, supra note 32, at 1703–18.

McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2012]

THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION

12/17/2012 2:51 PM

145

284

companies. The question the business community now faces is
whether it is better off rolling the dice in increasingly expensive
political gambles over the content of the regulations that must
inevitably govern the global marketplace or returning to a regulatory
system in which expert judgment plays a prominent role and longstanding statutory policies are afforded due respect.
Second, politicians who are inclined to regard shrinking
government as the solution to every social problem must be prepared
to accept the responsibility for future disasters when the
consequences fall on their own constituents. As Congress continues to
reduce the resources available to regulatory agencies and as
individual members of Congress continue to intervene in the bloodsport battles that rage over individual rulemaking initiatives, it will
become increasingly implausible to blame the bureaucrats in charge
of hamstrung programs for future catastrophes. Additionally,
advocates for consumers and the environment will be able to point a
finger with increasing plausibility at the politicians who accepted
large campaign contributions at the same time that they were
divesting regulatory agencies of their protective powers. If they would
like to avoid savage attacks from the victims of the next tragedy
brought on by a failure of the regulatory system, these politicians may
be well-advised to rein in their own overly aggressive attacks on
regulatory agencies during the battles over regulation.
Finally, the president must return the core responsibility for
managing regulatory initiatives to the political appointees he selects
to lead the agencies. Treating highly competent professionals like
Lisa Jackson as little more than symbolic payoffs to key political
constituencies, while divesting them of effective control over the most
important initiatives on their agencies’ agendas, is a strategy that is
doomed to failure over the long haul. Not only will an administration
that adopts this strategy take a justified beating in the media when the
next disaster happens, it will find it far more difficult to persuade
qualified people to serve in important administration jobs in the
future.
Unfortunately, the presidential inclination to locate all
momentous decisions within the White House walls has increased

284. Robert Dreyfuss, Grover Norquist: ‘Field Marshal’ of the Bush Tax Plan, THE
NATION (May 14, 2001), http://www.thenation.com/article/grover-norquist-field-marshal-bushplan#.
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dramatically during the last two decades. Presidents understandably
worry about loyalty of the civil service, and they are instinctively
reluctant to trust senior career officials, many of whom have
developed their own power bases within agencies and on Capitol Hill.
Quashing ongoing initiatives by the civil service is, unfortunately, far
easier for a new White House to accomplish than inspiring
bureaucrats to act aggressively in the public interest. Presidents have
dramatically expanded the number of handpicked and loyal staffers
who work within the ambit of the White House, organizing them into
various “councils” with broad and shifting portfolios. The
consequences of centralized review are that career employees must
report up a long chain of authority before taking significant action
and that regulated industries have multiple opportunities for political
appeals to reverse decisions they lost at the agency level.
As one of the oldest and most entrenched institutions of
centralized review, OIRA poses a formidable bottleneck for
protective regulation in both Republican and Democratic
administrations. Its staff is composed mostly of economists with
training in the details of cost-benefit analysis but scant experience
with the other disciplines, such as science and engineering, needed to
285
inform regulatory policy making. At the same time, the agencies
have developed their own sophisticated capacity to analyze the costs
and benefits of rules and are perfectly capable of advising the political
appointee who leads the relevant agency of broader policy
implications of particular rulemaking initiatives.
Centralized review hides policymaking behind closed doors,
wastes limited government resources, complicates agency prioritysetting, demoralizes civil servants, and costs the nation dearly in lost
lives, avoidable illness and injury, and destruction of irreplaceable
natural resources. President Obama’s preoccupation with centralized
review has undermined an important symbolic and programmatic
goal of his potentially transformative presidency because it has
obscured the urgency of reinvigorating health, safety, and
environmental agencies. Left uncorrected, this mistake may define his
historical legacy in the same negative way that a similar
preoccupation with control has already defined the legacy of his
predecessor, George W. Bush.

285. Steinzor, supra note 23, at 283.
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3. Changing the Narrative
Business groups have gained a great deal of political traction
with a powerful narrative based on economic freedom. They claim
that economic freedom is a necessary precondition to political and
individual freedom, and they easily adapt the concept to corporate
286
entities as well as individuals. Freedom is a widely shared human
value, but so is security. Most Americans understand that economic
freedom allows corporations to develop innovative products, to
match those products to consumer desires, and to provide useful
services to consumers at the lowest cost. But they also know that
corporations can use that freedom irresponsibly to defraud their
customers and harm their neighbors. Since corporations cannot be
motivated by concerns for others unless those others contribute to
their bottom lines, government must provide for the economic and
physical security of its citizens. Proponents of protective
governmental regulation have an opportunity to enlarge this concept
to include the shared value of economic and physical security that
should be at least as compelling as the business community’s focus on
its own freedom, especially in an era when corporations are making
287
record profits but not creating jobs at nearly the same pace.
During the Public Interest Era of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
consumer and environmental advocates invoked a narrative that
focused on corporate responsibility for the harms caused by
dangerous products and activities. During the past thirty years, the
business community has successfully redirected the corporate
responsibility narrative into a story about how companies can
voluntarily adopt more responsible approaches out of concern for
corporate image and the health of the economy. In the wake of the
recent confluence of crises, however, this perversion of the corporate
responsibility narrative has lost its vitality, and public interest
advocates have an opportunity to reinvigorate it in support of
288
stronger governmental protections.

286. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (1962); see also FRIEDRICH VON
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1976); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE
ASCENDANCY 15 (2007); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT
NATION 13 (2004).
287. Michael Powell, Corporate Profits Are Booming, Why Aren’t the Jobs?, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 8, 2011); Floyd Norris, As Corporate Profits Rise, Workers’ Income Declines, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 5, 2011).
288. Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1506 (2007).
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When the investigations that invariably follow a disaster
conclude that a company’s irresponsible conduct played a role in
causing the disaster, both the victims and the general public typically
demand that the company be held accountable for its wrongdoing. A
regulatory agency with an aggressive and well-financed enforcement
division is one institution that can hold corporations and their officers
and employees accountable for their misdeeds. Thus, corporate
accountability could provide the foundation for a third branch of the
narrative about the role of government in society.
Finally, disasters demonstrate in a dramatic way the social costs
of irresponsible corporate activities. In the absence of a perfectly
functioning tort system, regulatory agencies are in the best position to
minimize the social costs of company-caused disasters that society
ultimately bears through increased insurance premiums and taxes
invested in Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, a social-costs narrative
should resonate fairly robustly in a declining economy characterized
by large budget deficits and few new taxes.
These four narratives, and perhaps others, offer an alternative to
the economic freedom narrative that has dominated the political
economy for the last three decades. If carefully nourished and deftly
deployed during disasters, these narratives can contribute to the
daunting task of rebuilding trust in government in general and
regulatory agencies in particular.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure of Congress and the Obama Administration to react
to the Kingston disaster with either protective legislation or
regulation may be part of a larger phenomenon that does not bode
well for the resuscitation of the health, safety, and environmental
regulatory system in this country. Congress did not enact legislation
in response to the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, and the
regulatory response consisted largely of reorganizing and renaming
the pitifully ineffectual agency that had regulated deepwater drilling
289
in the past. The same failure to respond accompanied the Upper
Big Branch explosion of April 2010 and the massive Kingston
Tennessee spill of December 2008. If public trust in government
remains at its current low level and the institutions responsible for
protecting citizens from environmental disasters remain in their
current dysfunctional state, we can expect more dramatic disasters in
289. See MCGARITY, supra note 23.
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the future. If, however, supporters of good government and sound
environmental protection can create a new narrative to counter an
increasingly implausible anti-government creed, and if Congress can
be persuaded to provide adequate resources to agencies like the
EPA, we may find ourselves on the road toward a government that
protects us from domestic disasters as well as it protects us against
foreign attack.

